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I. INTRODUCTION
The laws that apply to child custody determinations outside of the
traditional nuclear family are based on conflicting concepts drawn from
biology, contract, mental state, and psychology. In contested cases involving
various forms of surrogacy, adoption, and the rights of unmarried fathers, the
legal system has repeatedly grappled with the definition of "parent" and the
rights to be accorded parental status in the context of determining the
appropriate custodian for the child. 1 Indeed, how we determine who is the
custodian of a particular child tells a story about legal understandings of the
value to be accorded parenthood.
While courts claim that they can separate the decision on parentage from
that on custody, their decisions show that they do not.2 This is because
parentage and custody are interrelated; pursuant to contemporary legal
doctrines, the designation of parent inevitably dictates the rights of all parties
involved. The determination of who can exercise parental rights affects who
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School; LL.M., Georgetown
University Law Center, 1989; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1983; A.B.,
Princeton University, 1979. Thanks to GW for its support of this Article; to Bob Brauneis,
Paul Butler, Brad Clark, Greg Maggs, Joan Meier, Mike Selmi, and Bob Tuttle for their
review of an earlier draft; to Tony Gambino, Jana Singer, and Merle Weiner for ongoing
discussions, encouragement, and comments; and to Jennifer Kleeman, Samantha Southall,
and Michelle Wu for research assistance.
1 For articles considering the meaning of "parent" in light of the new reproductive
technologies, see, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" of Reproduction: Reproductive
Technologies and the Parent-Child Bond, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1261 (1994); John Lawrence
Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental
Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991); Majorie MaGuire Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIs. L. REv. 297.
2 Indeed, in one prominent decision, the court explained "the determination of parentage
must precede, and should not be dictated by, eventual custody decisions." Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776, 782 n. 10 (Cal. 1993). Nonetheless, the issues are far more complex because
parentage does generally determine custody. In fact, in Johnson, the two individuals who
were defined as the "parents" received custody. See id. at 787.
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can receive custody; in turn, the parental rights determination reveals the
indeterminacy and social construction of the concept of parent.
When the nuclear family dissolves, the custodial rights of parents are
generally determined by their status as mother and father. There is a strong
societal and legal presumption that the parents are fit and proper custodians for
children and that they will act in their children's best interests.3 A third party
typically must prove the unfitness of both parents before being granted custody.
The rights of parents are thus much stronger than those of nonparents, and so a
determination of parentage purchases all of those rights, while severing the
rights of others.
In response to the increasing number of custody disputes between parents
and nonparents, the clear dichotomy between the rights of parents and the rights
of third parties against parents is dissolving. This dichotomy is breaking down
in two distinct and somewhat conflicting ways when there are multiple adults
seeking custody. First, courts have expanded the definition of parent to include
third parties, often without a biological connection to the child. At the same
time, courts have struggled to find only two persons entitled to the exclusive
rights associated with parental status. This has occurred in cases concerning
surrogate mothers and unwed fathers. Second, without expanding the number
of adults defined as parents, courts and legislatures are beginning to diminish
the exclusive rights of parental status by increasing the number of people to
whom the best interest standard applies, as has occurred in the adoption area.4
What unifies these cases is the legal system's efforts to define the parents of
any particular child and the effect of this decision on child custody
determinations. Throughout these cases, courts are struggling to determine child
custody by manipulating the rights of parents.
This Article explores how disputes are resolved when a party, aside from a
grandparent or other relative,5 with a colorable claim to parental status seeks
3 This is certainly true within the marital unit.
4 Consequently, the best interest of the child standard, which originated in disputes
between the two natural (or adoptive) parents, is sometimes extended beyond these situations
to resolve other types of cases which arise between biological parents and other types of
parents. It is somewhat difficult to determine whether these new applications of the best
interest standard, when they are made within the existing paradigm of parental rights without
a critical examination of that paradigm, actually benefit the child. In the adoption context, the
standard may disadvantage the biological parent who is not involved in a traditional family
relationship. Further, it may benefit the child by respecting her relationship with those outside
of her biological family. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About
Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REv. 637, 694 (1993) (explaining that in their attempts to preserve
the form of traditional families, courts may be willing to overlook biological facts).
5 For a discussion of their rights, see Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and
Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315 (1994)
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custody regardless of a finding as to the fitness of the biological parent(s). 6 It
examines the interaction of parental status with the best interest of the child
standard and shows how custody decisionmaldng must be recognized as a two-
step process: the first step is defining and identifying the parent(s), and the
second step is determining the child's best interests. These two steps are implicit
and obscured in the conventional divorce situation, where a husband and wife
who are presumed to be the parents must resolve child custody; and the two
steps are often conflated in any other type of custody proceeding.
Separating out these two implicit strands reveals the assumptions that
underlie child custody decisionmaking. By exploring how, outside of the
conventional divorce situation, manipulation of the concept of parent interacts
with the best interest standard, we can see how the parentage determination
affects custody outcomes. It is when the legal system must decide between
several competing parties who claim parental status, such as the surrogacy,
adoption, and unwed father cases, that attitudes about the appropriate parental
roles become visible. Fundamentally, these decisions show the inevitability of
tensions between the rights of parents and children, between nature and nurture,
and between relationships and rights. Part II of this Article discusses how the
law has defined parental rights, showing the historically contingent and different
meanings of "parent." It also examines the related issues of custody
decisionmaling between parents and third parties and some of the problems
associated with the best interest standard. Part III surveys several of the new
situations in which the need to redefine parent has arisen, examining cases
involving adoption, "traditional" gestational and "nontraditional" genetic
surrogacy, and unwed fathers. Part IV turns to an analysis of the effects on
parents' and children's rights of the malleability, and consequent indeterminacy,
of the concept of parent. Part IV also reviews several solutions that have been
[hereinafter Czapanskiy, Grandparents]; Karen Czapanskiy, Babies, Parents, and
Grandparents: A Story in Two Cases, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 85 (1993) [hereinafter
Czapanskiy, Babies]. Even the grandparent visitation statutes discussed by Professor
Czapanskiy generally deny the rights of grandparents to seek visitation orders against an intact
married family, although this is changing. See Czapanskiy, Grandparents, supra, at 1331
n.66.
6 1 will refer throughout this paper to the biological rather than the "natural" parents.
Virtually all of the situations in which the issues that I discuss arise are between parents with
some biological connection (ranging from gestational and genetic parent to gestational or
genetic parent) or between such a parent and a party without such a connection. In a recent
article, Professor Carolyn Kaas labels "child custody disputes between a biological or legally
adoptive parent and anyone else who is neither" as "'third-party' custody cases." Carolyn W.
Kaas, Breaking Up a Family on Putting it Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in
Favor of Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1045, 1047
(1996).
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suggested as a means of defining the parent(s) and determining the appropriate
custodian of the child. Because these solutions focus only on the first step of
defining "parent," they generally do not address the interrelated issues of the
child's interests. 7
In Part V, I argue that we must acknowledge whose interests are being
protected and whose disadvantaged when we redefine the meaning of "parent"
and apply the best interest standard. There needs to be a more explicit
recognition of all parties' rights, responsibilities, and emotional attachments,
together with a speedy determination of all such disputes, in order to resolve
appropriately custody disputes. Under contemporary approaches to child
custody decisionmaking, the decision of who qualifies as a parent clearly affects
the outcome of the application of the best interest of the child standard.
Although the rhetoric remains centered on the child, the focus in child custody
decisionmaking is, in actuality, displaced from the child's best interests to the
parents' rights.
Ultimately, this Article suggests that once we admit that the child's best
interest is defined in the context of the identity of the parents, against a
background of strong socially-held assumptions about parental rights to the
custody of their children, we will have a better understanding of how to resolve
these cases. The Article argues for separate consideration of the rights of
parents and the rights of children rather than the existing system under which
we consider the rights of parents under the (dis)guise of the best interests of the
child. This Article then suggests a two-step process for making decisions about
children: the first stage consists of a determination of the identity of the parents,
while the second stage involves a resolution of the child's best interests. This
first stage, which might in appropriate situations require the recognition of
multiple "parents" based on biology and affinity,8 is significant because it
explicitly accords rights to adults independent of the child's interests. The first
stage provides the framework for the second stage, which in turn requires a
determination of how, within the context of the number of interested adults, to
make a decision that best serves the child.9
7 It is, and should be, difficult to separate out the two steps. See June Carbone, Child
Custody and the Best Interests of Children, 29 FAM. L.Q. 721, 736-37 (1995) (book review)
(identifying three obstacles to separating out parents' and children's interests).
8 See infra note 165. As discussed later, resistance to the concept of multiple parents
may be based on an ideology which requires one parent of each sex for a child, or on theories
of the development of infant attachment. See infra note 200.
9 Best serving the child's interests could range from providing her with independent
representation in all contested custody-related proceedings to judicially reviewing an
agreement promulgated by the parents. See generally Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability
to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigalion, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1571,
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While the redefinition of "parent" occurs in a small number of cases,
including contested adoptions, surrogacy agreements that disintegrate, and some
unwed father paternity suits, it reveals cultural assumptions about the
meaning(s) of parenthood, showing how parenthood is a culturally constructed
institution, and how custody is dependent on the identity of the parents. If, both
within and outside conventional custody situations, the legal system attempts to
recognize and separate out the interests of the parents and those of the children,
then we can hope for better outcomes for the children.
II. PARENTAL RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIEs, AND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Historically, gender and marital status have been the critical factors in
determining parental rights. Married parents had virtually absolute child
custody rights against anyone who sought to interfere with them, while
unmarried parents had less determinate rights. Until the early nineteenth
century, in the rare event that married couples separated, the father was entitled
to custody of the children because they were his "property." By the late
nineteenth century, the mother was seen as the proper custodian. Today, when
married or unmarried parents separate, both parents have equal rights to
custody under a best interest of the child standard, while third parties are
subject to a different standard in order to receive custody. The best interest
standard thus appears in two contexts: it is assumed that it is in the child's best
interest for a parent to receive custody, and in disputes between parents, the
same standard determines which of the parents will become the custodian.
This section discusses the changing nature of parental rights and contrasts
the rights of parents with those of third parties. This section further shows the
value and constructed nature of "true parental rights," demonstrating that
marriage, sex, and race affects the bundle of rights accorded to parents.' 0
1583-84, 1583 n.59 (1996). The best method for serving the child's interests will undoubtedly
be situation-specific.
10 C. MICHEi. FOUCAULT, Powm,/KNowrIXE 131-32 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980);
Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childood and Reconstucting the Legal Order: The Case
for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083 (1991) (showing the constructed
nature of childhood). Carol Sanger notes that "what motherhood means-as an icon, or
institution, a role or a status-is no longer certain.... Even a simple question like who is a
mother no longer has simple answers, now that genetic contributions, gestation, and stroller
pushing may each be provided by a different woman." Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many
Things, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & WoMEN's STUD. 15, 18 (1992). Interestingly enough, the




A. Custody Disputes Between Parents: The Child's Best Interests
The right of married parents to the custody and control of their children has
been a fundamental tenet of the American legal system." When it came to
intraparental disputes between married individuals, nineteenth century courts
"seesaw[ed between] the traditional common law rights of father and the natural
rights claim of the mother[;]' 12 when the parents were unmarried, the father
had virtually no rights. Today, most states use a best interest of the child
standard to determine custody rights between both married and unmarried
parents. While this standard has been subject to numerous criticisms, it remains
the almost universal method for ensuring that legal decisionmakers consider
children's interests in intraparental conflicts.
1. The Value and Meanings of Parental Rights
At common law, parental rights were both "exclusive and indivisible, " 13 at
least with respect to marital children. Moreover, these rights were unalienable
and inviolable. '4 They belonged to the biological mother and father of children,
so long as they were married. Marriage, which was critically important because
it served as "'the foundation of the family and society,"' guaranteed parental
rights. 15
When the biological parents were not married to each other, the law
differed with respect to the bundle of rights that attached to parenthood and the
individuals who were accorded parental status. At English common law and in
colonial America, nonmarital children had no legally recognized relationship
11 See generally NIcam GROssBERG, GovERNNG THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985); MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER's
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RiGTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNID STATES
(1994).
12 MASON, supra note 11, at 61.
13 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Staus: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879, 883 (1984). As Nancy Polikoff explains, "Customarily, legal parenthood is an all-or-
nothing status. A parent has all of the obligations of parenthood and all of the rights; a
nonparent has none of the obligations and none of the rights." Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 471 (1990).
14 See Jaimal S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modem American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042 (1979). For
a discussion of adoption, see infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
15 See GROSSBERG, supra note 11, at 18 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888)) (summarizing the status of marriage during the Republican era).
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with either biological parent, and the parents had no recognized familial
relationship with the child. 16 Not until the end of the nineteenth century did
most states enact laws recognizing that "illegitimate" children were part of their
mothers' families. 17 Black slave children were treated like "illegitimate"
children, in that their social status derived from their mothers, and their fathers
had no parental rights.' 8 And, until the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in
Stanley v. illinois, the majority of states had laws under which fathers of
nonmarital children had few rights with respect to custody or consent to
adoption (although they did have support obligations). 19 Unless they had
16 See 1 WKrIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459 (William C. Jones ed. 1916);
GROSSBERG, supra note 11, at 197; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICA LAw *212
(13th ed. 1884); MASON, supra note 11, at 24-25. But see GROSSBERG, supra note 11, at 198
(finding that under the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576, the parents of an illegitimate child
became responsible for her upbringing); JACOBUS TENBROEK, FAMLY LAw AND TIE POOR
31 (Joel F. Handler ed. 1971). See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, hLEGrIMACY: LAW AND
SocL PoucY (1971). Thus, parents may have had an economic responsibility without a
corresponding social responsibility. Parenthood was thus split between economic and social
aspects.
17 See MASON, supra note 11, at 68. The term "illegitimate" connotes various negative
stereotypes about the status of nonmarital children; in light of changing social and legal
attitudes towards these children, it is useful only in an historical sense to remind us of those
stereotypes.
18 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic le, 62 U. Cit. L. REv. 209, 225-27, 250
& n.168 (1995). In Virginia, all African-American children derived their status from their
mothers. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEo. L.J. 1967 passim
(1989).
19 In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois
statute pursuant to which unwed fathers were not defined as "parents." See id. at 646, 658.
Stanley was decided within a year of when Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was first
argued. The Court expanded unwed fathers' rights at the same time as it considered women's
rights to autonomy in the childbearing context. Not until 1973 did the Court hold that
unmarried fathers had a constitutional obligation to support their children. See Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
For a discussion of the rights of unwed fathers, see W. J. Dunn, Annotation, Necessity
of Securing Consent of Parents of llegitimate Child to Its Adoption, 51 A.L.R. 2d 497, 503-
14 (1957 & Supp. 1987, 1996); see also Norma G. Tabler, Jr., Paternal Rights in the
Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM.
L. 231, 231-33, 245 (1971) (stating that generally an unwed father had no rights to visitation
without consent of the custodial mother and no right to consent to adoption); Benjamin G.
Reeves, Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights after Stanley v. Illinois: Problems
in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115, 116-17 (1973-74) (noting that historically,
notwithstanding the doctrine of nuliusfiius, the unwed father was legally required to support
the child); Frederick C. Schafrick, Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the
19971
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"legitimated" their children, fathers were not allowed to exercise parental
powers; in effect, they were defined as nonparents. 20
Even with respect to marital children, however, in the context of
intraparental disputes, the rights of mothers and fathers and the meaning of
parenthood has differed. During marriage, the husband had virtually complete
authority over all members of his household. 21 At divorce, prior to the early
nineteenth century, the child was considered the property of the father and the
father was entitled to all of the child's earnings. 22 Over the course of the
nineteenth century, however, the focus shifted from children as property to an
examination of the best interest of the child as a standard for awarding
custody. 23 Until the middle of this century, the best interest of young children
was closely identified with maternal custody pursuant to the so-called "tender
years presumption." 24 The tender years presumption developed during an era
when women were seen as responsible for guarding and maintaining a domestic
Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 1581, 1584 (1972) (noting that an
unwed father was not usually entitled to consent to adoption, nor even to notice of
proceedings).
20 For a defense of this assumption, see Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of
Marriage, Kinship, and Seual Privacy-Balancing the Intividual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REv. 463, 499 (1983). The cultural image of unwed fathers assumed they were
irresponsible. See Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis
in Context, 72 TEX. L. REv. 967, 979 (1994); Mary K. Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families
and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REv. 585, 587, 595
(1991).
21 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMMUCAN LAW 269 (1990) (noting that a husband had "powers over the property and
services of his wife and children, including the power to discipline them"). See generally
Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 Gao. L.J. 1359 (1983);
Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).
22 See GROSSBERG, supra note 11, at 237-42; MASON, supra note 11, at xiii, 61-62.
2 3 While this outline of the historical development of custody law is generally accurate, it
does neglect "the overlapping images, turmoil, and inner contradictions of family culture and
family law," including the contested meanings of the child's best interests. See Barbara B.
Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 995, 1039-40 (1992). As Professor Woodhouse points out, the conflict
between notions of children as parental property and children as individuals continues today.
See id. at 1121. See supra note 11 for further discussion.
24 See GROSSBERG, supra note 11, at 239-40; see also Mary E. Becker, The Rights of
Unwed Parents: Feminist Approaches, 1989 Soc. Smwv. REv. 496 (detailing a brief history of
the rights of married and unmarried parents). One of the earliest articulations of the tender
years presumption was in Helms v. Franciscus, 2 BLAND CH. (Md.) 544, 563 (1832).
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sphere, while men were viewed as active in the public sphere. 25 Consequently,
the married father was somewhat disadvantaged with respect to child custody of
younger children after divorce, although he was entitled to visitation and he
could block an adoption.
Historically, the exclusive and indivisible rights of parents have varied
depending on gender and marriage. Today, married parents have equal rights to
the custody of their children, although these rights become most visible and are
often readjusted at divorce when courts decide custody and set child support
awards. Outside of marriage, paternal rights have shifted with states
recognizing the ability of unwed fathers to establish parental relationships with
their children through a variety of mechanisms. 26 While maternal rights to
nonmarital children have become less exclusive as the rights of unwed fathers
have expanded, mothers continue to have a strong legally recognized
relationship with their children.
2. Detennining Custody
a. Application of the Best Interest Standard
When it comes to custody determinations between the two biological
parents, courts in virtually every state are charged by statute with determining
the custodial situation that will be in the child's best interests. There is an
underlying assumption in most jurisdictions that an award to a biological parent
will be in the child's best interests. 27 Thus, underlying usage of the best interest
25 For a discussion of the private/public sphere ideology, particularly as it applied to
white New Englanders, see NANCY Corr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: WOMAN'S SPHmE
IN NEw ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977). For a similar discussion with respect to black women,
see HAZEL V. CARBY, RECONSTRUCrING WOMANHOOD (1987).
The tender years presumption was repeatedly challenged as discriminatory, and held
unconstitutional, beginning in the mid-1970s. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686,
695-96 (Ala. 1981); Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1380-83 (D.C. 1978).
26 See, e.g., UNiF. PARENTAGE Acr § 4 (Presumption of Paternity), 9B U.L.A. 287,
298 (1987 & Supp. 1996). Where the unwed father has not established a substantial
relationship with his child, he may not have any parental rights. See infra Part mrI.C. Thus,
paternal rights may differ dramatically depending on the father's relationship with the child.
For example, California differentiates between presumed fathers and biological fathers. See
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West Supp. 1996). The Supreme Court has never addressed the
rights of the unwed father with respect to an infant whom the mother seeks to relinquish for
adoption.
27 See, e.g., Ross v. Hoffman, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. 1977); S.M. v. A.W., 656
A.2d 841, 844 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Montgomery v. Roudez, 509 N.E.2d 499,
502 (Il. App. Ct. 1987).
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of the child is a presumption of the fitness of either biological parent to act as
the custodian. For sole custody, the legal system is simply deciding who is, in
some sense, more fit and better for the child to live with, and there is a strong
presumption of liberal visitation rights for the other parent. When the best
interest of the child standard is used, there is no legal presumption as to which
parent would be better,28 and either parent may receive custody without
proving his or her fitness to do so. That is, as a threshold matter, a parent need
not prove her fitness as a custodian, although the other parent may prove that
he will be a better custodian. With respect to joint custody, the decision is that
both parents are appropriate, and the courts must simply decide on how to
allocate physical and legal custody between them.29
To decide between the two parents, the best interest of the child standard
generally requires judges to balance a series of factors which are often listed in
the statute. Among the factors to be considered pursuant to the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA") are the parents' wishes and the child's
interactions with other significant persons. 30 Unlike the parents' wishes, the
For a somewhat outdated analysis of the strength to be accorded parental rights in each
jurisdiction, see Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right
to Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705 (1986).
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which sets out a best interest standard for
custody decisions, explains that the standard preserves "familiar presumptions," such as a
parent being "usually preferred to a nonparent." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE Acr § 402
cmt., 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
28 In practice, women are, of course, more likely to receive custody when it is
unopposed. When fathers seek custody, however, the data are contested concerning whether
fathers are more or less likely than mothers to receive it. See, e.g., ELEANOR MACCOBY
& ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDNIG THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY
113 (1992) (citing a California study, where parents seek conflicting outcomes, "mothers
succeed twice as often as fathers in securing their preferred outcome"); Martha L. Fineman
& Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody
Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 107, 121 (arguing that a man has a better than
equal chance of obtaining custody); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief
Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 235,
236 (1982) (discussing the differing statistics). While the standard in practice differs from its
theory, there is no explicit presumption for either parent.
29 Joint custody can take many forms, ranging from fully shared legal aid physical
custody where both parents are jointly responsible for making significant child-rearing
decisions and are involved in the daily activities of the child, to shared legal or physical
custody. For a further discussion, see MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 28; JoINT
CuSTODY AND SHARED PAREmsTG (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed., 1991).
30 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402 (1), (3), 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987); see
also Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 2215, 2219 (1991) (discussing as typical the factors in
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wishes of the significant persons are irrelevant, at least pursuant to the statute,
thereby reinforcing parental rights. 31
Even statutes which seem to accord rights to nonparents where there is an
intraparental custody dispute, still accord parents the strongest of rights. For
example, the Texas courts must appoint a "conservator" to care for the child.32
A parent will be appointed as conservator unless "the court finds that
appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the
child because the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical
health or emotional development." 33 From this phrasing, it might appear that a
third person could obtain custody simply by showing that it is not in the child's
best interests to stay with her parents. But, the appointment of the parent must
have a significant negative effect on the child before the third party will be
considered. Such effects go far beyond a mere finding relating to the child's
best interests and reinforce the strength of the parents' rights.
Determining the child's best interest in a contested custody dispute may
involve lengthy expert testimony together with disputed evidence from the
parties; the child may also be called as a witness. It is a time-consuming and
often agonizing process because the judge has so much discretion in
formulating the decision.34
the UMDA). Recently, states have also begun to include domestic violence in the list of
factors. See Naomi R. Calm, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Czild Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991); Developments in the
Law, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1498, 1603-06 (1993).
31 The visitation provision only discusses the rights of parents not granted child custody.
See UNit. MARmAGE AND DIvoRCE Acr § 407, 9A U.L.A. 612 (1987). Again, the rights of
third parties are not even considered.
32 See TEx. F~m. CODE ANN. § 153.005 (West 1996).
33 See id. at § 151.131. A court can appoint a nonparent as conservator if the parent has
voluntarily relinquished control of the child and the nonparent's appointment would be in the
child's best interest. See id. at § 153.373. Here, while the phrase "best interest" is used, it is
not applicable until the child is out of the parents' control.
The Montana Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the UMDA which would
have granted a nonadoptive step-parent the right to request and receive custody when the
custodial parent died because it interfered with a parent's constitutional right to custody. See
In re A.R.A., 919 P.2d 388, 392 (Mont. 1996).
34 For an insight into one family court judge's decisionmaking methods, see Jan
Hoffnan, Judge Hayden's Family Values, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at
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b. Criticisms of the Best Interest Standard
Over the years, the best interest standard has been subjected to continuous
criticism.35 The best-known analysis of the standard is Robert Mnookin's
"indeterminacy" critique.36 Twenty years ago, he argued that our inability to
make predictions about what custodial situation would be in the child's best
interests and to determine what set of social values should guide judicial
discretion exposed the indeterminacy inherent in the standard.37 For example,
Professor Mnookin notes that judges are entrusted with discretion but they
often, if not always, lack the requisite information with which to make a
custody determination: they do not know enough about the parties' past
relationship to make predictions about the future custodial situation.38 Professor
Mnookin ultimately concludes that even if the best interest standard results in
random decisionmaking, it nonetheless serves values such as expressing
concern for the child.39 Thus, notwithstanding the flaws of the best interest
standard, Professor Mnookin respects its symbolism.
Others are even harsher in their critique of the best interest standard.
Feminist critiques center on the many different ways in which the standard
disadvantages women.40 Some feminists have argued not only that the best
interest standard favors men because it does not recognize the contributions of
women as primary caretaker but also that it cedes too much control to
experts.41 Professor Mary Becker, who advocates a maternal deference
35 It is not my goal to repeat many of these criticisms. For a concise summary of the
arguments against judicial discretion in custody decisionmaking, see Schneider, supra note
30, at 2219.
36 See Robert Mnookin, C7ild-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Function in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CoNTEM. PROBs. 226 (Summer 1975).
37 See id.
38 See id. at 257.
39 See Mnookin, supra note 36, at 291; see also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. Cmu. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1987) (suggesting
randomized custody decisionmaking); cf. David L. Chambers, Rethinlng the Substantive
Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 488 (1984) (noting that the
concept of children's best interests "has no objective content").
40 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 H~Av. L. REv. 829, 869-70
(1990) (noting that feminists ask "the woman question").
41 See, e.g., MARTHA A. FNEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALY: THm RHTpc AND
REA=Ir OF DrvORCE RE oRM 85-94 (1991); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo,
and Chid Custody, I S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 133 (1992); Martha A. Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REV. 727 (1988) [hereinafter Fineman, Dominant Discourse].
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standard,42 argues that the best interest standard is "systematically biased
against mothers" in several different ways. 43 She notes "six common biases:
(a) against a sexually active mother, (b) against a mother with less money than
the father, (c) against a working mother, (d) against a lesbian mother,
(e) against a mother involved in an interracial marriage, and (f) in favor of a
remarried father. "44 Moreover, Professor Becker argues that the best interest of
the child standard does not adequately recognize the emotional closeness and
intimacy between a mother and her child.45
Professor Martha Fineman criticizes the standard from a different
perspective. She believes that it allows social workers to pre-empt lawyers and
impose their own misogynistic biases on the custodial outcomes. Consequently,
she argues women are, again, disadvantaged because their custodial claims are
not treated seriously.46 In addition, Professor Fineman argues that the best
interest test is applied acontextually, within a no-fault degendered divorce
scheme which fails to consider the experiences of mothers as primary
caretakers. 47
As a result of these critiques, legal scholars and activists have developed
alternative standards such as presumptions for joint custody or for the primary
caretaker. Both of these are generally justified by reference to the child's best
4 2 The maternal deference standard appears similar to the older "tender years
presumption"; it is different, however, both because its proponents ground it in positive
images of women as well as because it attempts to recognize the reality that mothers generally
continue to provide primary care to children. See Becker, supra note 41, at 203.
43 See id.
44 Id. Some of Professor Becker's criticisms of the biases of the best interests standard
apply, of course, to fathers; for example, a father who is gay or who is in an interracial
relationship may also experience discrimination.
45 See id.
46 There are at least three other critiques of the best interest standard. First, some
suggest that because of the seeming neutrality of the standard, the party seeking custody
(generally the mother) will unnecessarily relinquish other rights so that she can have custody.
See Cahn, supra note 30, at 1041; Jana Singer & William Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint
Custody, 47 MD. L. Rnv. 497, 503, 515-17 (1988). A second critique of the standard
suggests that it is only the parents' not the child's interests that are actually considered. "ITMhe
'best interests' of any particular child always yield to the constitutional claims of their
parents.... [P]arents who refuse to support their children and even abusive parents retain
their constitutional visitation rights, enforceable against the child's will and regardless of the
child's 'best interests.'" Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 11, 60 (1994). A third critique is that the best
interest standard does not reflect parental preferences, nor accurately predict the actual future
custodial arrangement. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child
Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 619-30 (1992).
4 7 See Fineman, Dominant Discourse, supra note 41, at 768-69.
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interests. 48 More radical proposals have questioned the utility of attempting to
determine the child's best interests, suggesting for example, that the child be
allowed to speak for herself or that courts simply replicate the custodial
situation that existed prior to the divorce.49
Nonetheless, the best interest standard is still the standard in forty-nine
states and the District of Columbia, and even the alternative standards such as
the primary caretaker,5 0 are justified by reference to it. Its rhetoric is appealing,
perhaps even irresistible. As one commentator points out, "using the phrase in
a ruling on a child custody dispute comes as naturally to a state court judge as
breathing." 51
B. Third Party Custody Standards
If a third party seeks custody, there is another layer of legal hurdles that
precedes an analysis of the best interests of the child.52 Traditionally, the third
party has been required to prove the unfitness of the natural parents before
attempting to establish any rights to the child. Third parties typically have
48 For example, the District of Columbia recently enacted the Joint Custody of Children
Act of 1996 which provides: "There shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in
the best interest of the child." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5) (1996).
49 See infra Part IV for further discussion of alternatives to the child's best interests. For
advocacy of children's representation, see Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the
Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDozo L. REv.
1523 (1994). For a discussion on the proportionality proposal, see Scott, supra note 46.
50 The best known articulation of the primary caretaker standard is in Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
51 Jeanne L. Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IowA L. REv. 585, 616-17 (1994).
For Native American children, the presumptions with respect to the best interest of the
child may differ. The purpose of the Indian Child Welfare Act "includes both the protection
of 'the best interests of Indian children' and the promotion of 'the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families."' Barbara A. Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses
and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 1051, 1058 (1989) (quoting 25
U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (Congressional Declaration of Policy)). Again, this shows the
alternatives to our current structure for child custody decisionmaking.
52 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041 (West 1994) (finding that a court must find that
award to a parent would be "detrimental to the child"); Locklin v. Duka, 929 P.2d 930, 934-
35 (Nev. 1996) (holding that, even where grandpparents were appointed as guardians for
seven years and where mother retained only a sporadic contact with child over a five period,
mother is proper custodian because of "'parental preference' presumption."); see also
Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus
Parents, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1209, 1215 nn.27-28 (1994) (collecting cases and statutes setting
out the presumption of the fitness of the natural parent).
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established their rights through an adoption proceeding, rather than through
custody cases. 53 Indeed, at least one court claims a constitutional basis to the
parental rights doctrine grounded in Meyer v. Nebraska,54 Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,55 and related cases.56 Thus, children may only be adopted by third
parties once their parents' rights have been terminated either voluntarily or
through a finding of unfitness. 57 Until the parent's unfitness has been shown,
there is a presumption that she will win any custody case against any
nonparent. 58 The fitness standard protects the rights of biological parents by
placing a formidable burden on third parties. The presumptions pursuant to a
best interest standard favor neither parent with respect to a third party; pursuant
to a fitness standard, the presumption runs in favor of either parent vis-A-vis a
53 Generally, the rights of the biological parents must be terminated before a child is
available for adoption. It has typically been difficult, although not impossible, for third parties
to defeat the custody claims of the biological parents outside of the adoption area.
Guardianship proceedings are another method for establishing caretaking rights. See
ROBERT H. MNooiuN & D. KELLY WEIsBERG, CHI.D FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND
MATERiALs ON CHmDREN AND THE LAw 711-12 (3d ed. 1995); see also Czapanskiy,
Grandparents, supra note 5 passim.
54 262 U.S. 390, 390-91 (1923) (holding that a statute which prohibits the teaching of
modem language unconstitutionally interferes with a parent's right to direct the upbringing
and education of their children).
55 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that requiring children to attend public schools
unconstitutionally interferes with a parent's right to direct the upbringing and education of
their children).
56 See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Ga. 1995) (holding
unconstitutional a state statute allowing for grandparent visitation rights because of
interference with parental rights to raise their children without undue state interference); see
also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577-79 (Tenn. 1993) (same analysis under state
constitution). But see Haynie, supra note 27, at 736-37 (claiming parental-rights doctrine is
unconstitutional based on the unwed fathers' cases).
57 When a state seeks to terminate parental rights, there must be clear and convincing
evidence of the unfitness. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982).
58 In In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Wis. 1995), a lesbian coparent petitioned
for custody of the biological child of her former lover. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that, unless she was proven to be unfit, the rights of the biological parent were superior to
those of a third party. See id. at 424.
While some jurisdictions allow adoptions to proceed if a parent is withholding consent
contrary to the child's best interests, see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304(e) (1981), the
standards are generally interpreted far more strictly than a simple best interest test. For
example, in Washington, D.C., the third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that allowing the adoption to proceed is in the child's best interest. See In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d
860, 864 (D.C. 1977). This is in accord with the Supreme Court's Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745,
and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), decisions.
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third party. For example, even when the father has shot the mother, courts may
award the children to him over a third party because of his rights as the
biological parent.59 Under the UMDA, a nonparent cannot sue for custody if a
parent has physical custody.60 The explanatory comments note that this section
was "devised to protect the 'parental rights' of custodial parents and to insure
that intrusions upon those rights will occur only when" the parents are abusing
or neglecting their children.61
While some of the best interest standards appear to apply to third parties as
discussed above, the actual statutory and judicial language continues to place a
higher burden on third parties than on the parents. As an example, consider the
recently decided case of Rowles v. Rowles in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court eliminated, "'the presumption per se"' in favor of parents. 62 A mother
sought custody of her two young children, each of whom had spent the majority
of their lives with their paternal grandparents. 63 Both the trial and appellate
courts, which used the presumption in favor of parents over third parties,
nonetheless awarded custody to the grandparents. The Supreme Court abolished
the presumption and awarded custody to the mother. The court recognized that
"the parental relationship is by far the most weighty factor in the custody
determination" and that there is "absolutely nothing in the record which casts
doubt on the expectation that [the mother] bears normal human solicitude, care,
devotion, and love for her offspring." 64 Even without the customary
presumption, the mother received custody.
When someone who might otherwise be termed a third party seeks custody,
it is thus clearly preferable to be deemed a parent than a nonparent. As a
parent, she will be proceeding pursuant to the best interest of the child standard,
rather than being required not only to prove the unfitness of the parents, but
59 See, e.g., Walker v. Fagg, 400 S.E.2d 208 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (discussed in
Bottoms v. Bottoms: Erasing the Presumption Favoring a Natural Parent over Third
Paries- What Makes this Mother Unfit?, 2 GEo. MASON IND. L. REV. 457, 463-64 (1994));
In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
60 See UNw. MARPiAGE A'D DiVORCE Acr, § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 550 (1987).
61 See id. at § 401 cmt.
62 Rowles v. Rowles, 668 A.2d 126, 128 (Pa. 1995) (quoting Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa.
363, 374 (1980) (Flaherty, J., concurring)).
63 Te parents moved in with the paternal grandparents when their older child was
almost two. When the younger child was two months old, the parents moved out, leaving
both children with the grandparents. Rowles, 668 A.2d at 127. Although cases involving
relatives seeking custody are generally beyond the scope of this Article, Rowles provides an
excellent example of the rhetoric that surrounds pronouncements about the end of the parental
presumption. For some of the special concerns raised by grandparent cases, see Czapanskiy,
Grandparents, supra note 5.
64 Rowles, 668 A.2d at 130.
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also to prove that it is in the best interest of the child to be placed with the third
party. While the rights of parents against each other differ somewhat, there
remains a strong legal presumption that they are the best custodians for their
children and that their rights are stronger than those of any third party.
IH. REDEFINING PARENT
When courts and legislatures have been presented with custody disputes
outside of the conventional two-parent family, each has struggled to find the
appropriate solution. Courts or legislatures have generally taken one of two
approaches: they have either sought to redefine who the parent is so that there
are two parents for each child, or they have analogized the situation to the more
conventional two-parent families to which the best interest standard is
applicable, even where there are more than two "parents."65
When, as in the surrogacy and unwed father cases, the parents did not have
(or are unmarried and no longer have) an intimate relationship with each other,
but each has a biological connection to the child, courts have sought to find
only two parents for every child. By contrast, in the adoption context when
there is no biological connection, courts have sometimes expanded the notion of
parent so that there are multiple sets of parents. Thus, some courts are, on the
one hand, changing the status of parents so that the bundle of rights associated
with that status is changing, while others simply redefine who is entitled to the
status of parents so that each child has only one mother and one father. In both
types of cases, the change seems driven by an attempt to find a rationale
according nonbiologically-related "parents" some rights to the child. The best
interest of the child standard has no substantive content in either type of case.
Where courts seek to find only two parents, they are acting on a general
presumption that it is in the child's best interests to find two parents married to
each other. Alternatively, when courts apply the best interest standard to choose
among several sets of parents, they almost invariably grant custody to the
nonbiological parents.
A. Choosing Between Two Sets of Parents: Adoption
Until Massachusetts enacted a statute to regulate adoption in 1851, adopters
had virtually no rights if the biological parents returned for their child.66 As
65 Robert Mnookin predicted, twenty years ago, "that trial courts may now use the best-
interest-of-the-child standard and such new concepts as 'psychological parenthood' to reject
the claims of a child's natural parents." Mnookin, supra note 36, at 226.
66 See Janet H. Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 924 (1991); see also Zainalfin, sUPra note
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attitudes towards adoption changed, adopters were able legally to formalize
their new relationship with the child and, as discussed above, by the middle of
the twentieth century they generally needed only the consent of the biological
mother for an adoption.67 Nonetheless, as the negative stigma of illegitimacy
has begun to dissipate and as biological fathers have begun to assert their
power, the rights of biological parents, especially fathers, are getting more
attention and protection. 68
Children are unavailable for adoption unless the rights of their biological
parents have been legally terminated. Consequently, not only conflicting claims
between people asserting parental rights but also the best interest of the child
standard would seem to be completely irrelevant to adoption proceedings
because there should be no competing claimants to the child.69 If the biological
14, at 1043-44. See generally Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9
VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956).67 Indeed, in 1956, my husband's biological mother never even named his biological
father at any stage in the adoption proceedings. Requiring only maternal consent was
consistent with the lack of legal recognition accorded to the unwed father's relationship with
the child. See supra notes 16-20.
6 8 See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis
in Context, 72 TEX. L. REV. 967 (1994); Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights,
Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 60 (1995).
Classifications based on illegitimacy are today subject to a constitutional standard of
intermediate review. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977).
69 A state's regulation of adoption is often justified as based on the best interests of the
child. See ADOPTION LAw AND PRACricE app. § 1-A (Joan Hollinger et al., ed. 1989)
(discussing adoption law in the fifty states). The prospective adoptive parents must be suitable
and the adoption must be in the child's best interest. But the application of the child's best
interests are only relevant after there has been a termination of parental rights and a child is
available for adoption. See id.
A state cannot remove a child from her parents merely because the potential adoptive
parents might be, in some sense, "better." See Joan H. HoUinger, Adoption Law, 3:1 FuruRE
OF CImDREN 43, 48 & n.22 (1993). Indeed, concern about the unwarranted removal of
children from their homes into a "better" environment provides some justification for
privileging biological. parenthood. Without such a preference, parenting would be subject to
race, class, and gender biases, and a market in babies would become more realistic. See
generally Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage,
7 J. LEGAL STum. 323 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in
Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59 (1987). See also Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate
Mother, 8 HAv. BLACXLzr J. 17, 30 (1991) (critiquing proposals that would commodify
children). The child welfare movement has historically sought to impose middle-class values
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parents block an adoption, then the child generally will be returned to them.70
There is simply no issue as to whether it would be in the best interests of the
child for her to remain with her biological parents, or for her to be adopted,
because of the strong presumption that a child belongs with her biological
parents.
And yet, a few states have struggled to develop approaches that redefine
adoption disputes so that the best interest standard may become applicable to
controversies that arise between the potential adoptive parents and the biological
parents. Under one approach, the legal system may label the potential adoptive
parents as "parents," entitled to all of the rights inherent in that status.
Alternatively, under another approach, the law may simply provide that an
adoption dispute between biological parents and the potential third-party
adopters is subject to the child's best interests. In a recent Colorado case, In re
C.C.R.S. ("C.C.R.S."), the court defined the potential adoptive parents as the
"psychological parents" because they had physical custody and had developed
strong emotional bonds with the child.71 The dispute thus became one between
the "natural [sic] parent and psychological parents," to which the court held
applicable the best interests of the child standard. 72 The court could use the
on poor families. See generally LiNDA GORDON, HERoEs OF THE OwN LIvs: TmE Pouarncs
AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988).70 Dramatic recent examples include the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica cases, where
children were very publicly returned to their biological parents. See In re Kirchner, 649
N.E.2d 324 (l. 1995) [hereinafter Baby Richard]; In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.
1993) [hereinafter Baby Jessica]. But see In re E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995)
[hereinafter Baby Enily]. Because this seems to be the current state of the law, adoptive
parents are fighting it. Moreover, the proposed Uniform Adoption Act would dramatically
change current law with respect to the rights of biological parents. See infra note 82.
71 Indeed, in its first footnote, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that "T.A.M. and
M.A.M., the psychological parents, are referred to hereinafter as the respondents." In re
C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 248 n.1 (Colo. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 118 (1995).
The psychological parent theory is derived from the work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert J. Solnit, who claim that it is "the prototype of true human relationship."
JOSEPH GoLurEN Er AL., BEYOND THE BEST hTm= OF THE CHaD (2d ed. 1979); see
also Carriere, supra note 51, at 618-25 (discussing use of psychological parent theory under
the Indian Child Welfare Act); Peggy C. Davis, "There is a Book Out... ": An Analysis of
Judicial Absorption of Legiskaive Facts, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1539, 1563-94 (1987).
72 See In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 248. The Colorado Supreme Court stated: "The
overriding question at issue in this case is whether the best interests of the child standard,
without a showing of parental unfitness, is the appropriate test for resolving a custodial
dispute between a natural parent and psychological parents." Id.
The court did address the relationship between the presumption for natural parents, and
custody awards to third parties by reviewing a line of Colorado cases in which custody had
not been awarded to a fit natural parent. See id. at 256-57. Unlike the C.C.R.S. situation,
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custody statute, rather than the adoption statute, to award custody to the
potential adoptive parents over the natural mother.
C.C.R.S. arose after a natural mother, C.R.S., had placed her baby with
the potential adoptive parents ("the 'Ms"') the day after he was born. C.R.S.
sought to revoke her consent to relinquish custody slightly less than six months
later. The 'Ms' then filed a petition for custody of the baby pursuant to the
state's Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act ("UDMA"), arguing that staying
with them would be in the child's best interests. Under the UDMA, any person
with "physical custody" of the child for six months could petition for custody.73
All three courts hearing C.C.R.S. agreed that the child's interests would
best be served through a custody award to the 'Ms.' 74 They were able to use
the best interest standard because they defined "physical custody" under the
UDMA to include the potential adoptive parents with whom the child had lived.
To reach this construction of physical custody, the Colorado courts looked to its
legislative history and found that the Colorado General Assembly had
recognized the significance of "psychological parents" 75 who might otherwise
be considered nonparents. 76
Each of the dissents in C. C.R.S. alleged that the courts were allowing the
potential adoptive parents to circumvent the state's adoption procedures and
consequently, the natural mother's rights had been violated. 77 The dissents
argued for a return to the two-step analysis of determining parental fitness first,
and then custody; without a finding of parental unfitness, the best interest of the
child standard was inapplicable. They asserted that once the prospective
however, each such case involved a family member with whom the child had resided for a
significant period of time seeking custody. See id.
73 See CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (West 1987). This provision can only
be used when the child is not in the physical custody of either parent; if the child were in the
parent's custody, then a third party would not have access to the best interest standard. See In
re C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995).
74 See In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 258; In re C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d at 1340, 1344; In re
C.C.R.S., No. 90-DR-117 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Delta County May 26, 1992) (decision on file
with author). The trial court awarded visitation to the biological mother. See id.
75 See, e.g., In re C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d at 1341.
76 Indeed, throughout the opinions, the 'Ms' are variously called "non-parents" or the
"psychological parents." See e.g., In re C. C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 252; In re C. C.R.S., 872 P.2d
at 1342.
77 See In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 246-55, 260-62 (Lohr, J., dissenting); In re
C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d at 1345-55 (Taubman, J., dissenting). It is interesting to examine closely
the language in the majority and dissenting opinions. For example, the appellate court noted
that the mother had attempted to revoke her consent "nearly six months" after the child's




adoptive parents acquired physical custody, use of the best interest standard
would make it very difficult for a natural parent to regain custody. 78
The determination whether six months is too long-or too short-a time for
a biological mother to be able to revoke her consent to an adoption 79 was not an
issue that was squarely addressed by the appellate courts in C.C.R.S. Instead,
the reasoning of the opinions in C. C.R.S. is based on an application of the best
interest of the child standard rather than any discussion of the underlying policy
issues. At a time of highly publicized revocation of consents to adoption,80 the
conflicts between the rights of the biological and adoptive parents in an
adoption proceeding are hard to ignore. The opinions in C.C.R.S. evince a lack
of self-consciousness about this issue. Indeed, the opinions carefully interpreted
the UDMA to permit the custody action to go forward, rather than discuss the
policies at issue in the choice to proceed under an adoption or a child-custody
statute, as advocated by the dissenters.
The opinions also sidestep any constitutional issues with respect to the
biological mother's rights. They distinguish the Supreme Court cases
considering the rights of unwed fathers to establish relationships with their
children on the basis that C. C.R.S. concerned only custody, not termination of
parental rights, which would, they concede, require a showing of unfitness with
a heightened standard of proof. They thus define (and arguably transform) a
7 8 See, e.g., In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 259-60 (Lohr, J., dissenting). This issue
generally arises in any contested adoption case. See, e.g., Baby Jessica, 502 N.W.2d 575,
649, 666-68 (Mich. 1993).
Courts are often reluctant to change physical custody. Moreover, it may be difficult for
the biological mother to stay in touch with the child. Indeed, the C.C.R.S. majority
disapprovingly noted that the biological mother had made "little effort" to maintain contact
with her child. It also noted, however, that the trial court had found that this was difficult for
the mother because of "the geographic distance between" her home and the child's home, and
the biological mother's "limited financial resources." In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 249 n.6.
79 It may be too disruptive to the child to remove her at that point. See Barbara B.
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1845 nn.431, 434 (1993) (citing research concerning the formation
of children's attachments). For the adoptive parents, it may also be a heart-wrenching
process. Setting the time period during which a biological parent's consent to an adoption can
be revoked is problematic because it counterpoises the rights of the biological parents, the
adoptive parents, and the child.
80 See, e.g., Baby Jessica, 502 N.W.2d at 642. The DeBoer Committee for Children's
Rights filed an amicus brief before the Colorado Supreme Court in C.C.R.S. In Baby Jessica,
the biological mother of Jessica DeBoer changed her mind about allowing her daughter to be
adopted shortly after her parental rights had been terminated; Jessica was returned to her
biological parents after she had lived with her potential adoptive parents for more than two
years. See id. at 642; see also Naomi R. Calm, Family Issue(s), 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 325,
325-26 (1994) (book review).
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potential adoption case between the biological parent and third parties into a
custody case where the dispute is between the parents. Consequently, to receive
custody in C.C.R.S., the adoptive parents are subject to the best interest of the
child standard, not a standard resting on a showing of the natural mother's
unfitness as would have happened in an adoption case. While it is unclear
whether this was the appropriate resolution under the circumstances of this
case, the court's solution nonetheless effectively circumvented the state's
adoption law.
The Colorado Supreme Court is not unique in its approach to the rights of
so-called psychological parents. Other states have awarded custody to certain
categories of third parties without a finding of unfitness against the biological
parents. 81 Rather than relabel the potential adoptive parents as "parents,"
another approach is simply to mandate that the best interest standard applies
when a proposed adoption disintegrates. In a recent Illinois statute, when an
adoption petition is unsuccessful, the court must make a custody determination
based on the best interest of the child. 82 The parties are the potential adoptive
parents, the biological parents with remaining parental rights, and the child.
83
81 See, e.g., Ortner v. Pritt, 419 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1992) (grandparents); Reflow v.
Reflow, 545 P.2d 894 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (aunt and uncle).
As in the precedents cited by the Colorado Supreme Court, however, third parties have
generally been either blood relatives or the mother's new husband. While courts have not
relied on consanguinity or affinity, and have used the power of the best interest of the child
standard to explain their decisions to award custody to the nonparent, it is extremely rare for
an unrelated third party to win such a case. The twin elements of physical custody and
familial relationship serve to explain virtually all of the earlier decisions in which biological
parents, who had not been proven unfit, lost custody.
82 See ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 750 J 50/20a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996). This is similar to
the approach under the Uniform Adoption Act, which states that if a petition for adoption is
denied for certain reasons, then "the court shall determine the minor's custody according to
the best interest of the minor." UNIp. ADO PTON Acr § 3-704 (1994); see also id. at §§ 2-408
to -409, 3-506.
In Maryland, a court can grant an adoption over the objection of the biological parent if,
based on clear and convincing evidence, it is in the child's best interest to terminate the
biological parent's rights. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-312(b) (1995). The statute
also sets out additional requirements, such as the child's development of significant feelings
towards the adoptive parents, before the termination can occur. See id. Notwithstanding the
use of the child's best interests, however, there remains a presumption that the biological
parent is best suited to care for the child which can be rebutted "by evidence of unfitness or
exceptional circumstances." In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 640 A.2d 1085, 1096 (Md. 1994).
The Maryland statute illustrates, once again, the importance of putting into context a state's
use of the best interest standard when it comes to the rights of parents against third parties.
See Mo. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-312.
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Such a statute grants rights to the different parents. Correspondingly, in some
sense, the best interest standard pre-empts the decision as to who the parents
actually are.
Naming additional sets of parents in the adoption context may be a good
thing because it acknowledges that a child develops significant relationships to
other adults. 84 When children have continuous contact with unrelated adults,
they can develop strong attachments to them.85 Focusing only on the child's
interests, and not on the nature of the adults' connection to the child may be
dangerous, however, if it is used to remove the child unjustly from the child
biological parents. 86 This tension-between recognizing a child's significant
relationship to nonbiologically-related adults, and respecting the rights of the
biological parents-is at the core of why courts attempt to fit these cases under
the best interest standard. Under the rubric of the best interest standard, courts
attempt to recognize all relevant interests, although they too often fail to accord
sufficient weight to any of them.
B. Surrogacy
In the surrogacy cases, courts generally assign parental status to two
individuals, rather than, as is beginning to happen in adoption cases, expanding
the number of people to whom a best interest analysis is applied. In the
traditional surrogacy cases where the same woman is the genetic and gestational
83 See ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 750 50/20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996). Others may be
granted leave to intervene. See id.
84 See Bartlett, supra note 13, at 902-11. In this ground-breaking article, Professor
Bartlett discusses the importance of recognizing that children form significant relationships to
adults other than their parents, and that when there are child custody disputes, these
relationships need to be recognized. See id. at 902. Professor Bartlett limits her proposal to
situations in which the child's relationship with her parents has been "interrupted." She
further sets out criteria, such as a requirement that the nonparent has had physical custody of
the child for six months, see id. at 946, a proposal which almost fits the situation in C.C.R.S.
See In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995).
85 See Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L.
REv. 269, 284 (1991).
86 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Can,
Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEx J. WoMEN & L. 75 (1993); Evan Stark,
Re-Presenting Women Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58
ALB. L. REv. 973, 1008-09 (1995); Michael R. Beeman, Note, Investigating Child Abuse:
The Fourth Amendment and Investigatory Home Wsits, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1034, 1056
n.165 (1989).
Supporters of this approach would, of course, argue that they are focusing on the nature




mother, courts apply a best interest analysis to choose the two parents, although
the intent of the parties is highly relevant. In the nontraditional surrogacy cases
where one woman contributes the genetic material and another gestates that
material, courts find only two "natural" parents.
1. Choosing Between Two Biological Parents: Traditional Surrogacy8 7
In the traditional surrogacy cases, courts have begun to apply a best interest
analysis to determine which parent is entitled to custody. Rather than upholding
the validity of the surrogacy contract and requiring the biological mother to
relinquish all rights to her child, courts can reach a comparable result through a
best interest analysis, even as they seemingly accord parental rights to the
biological mother. Courts struggle to assimilate surrogacy into the confines of
the two-parent family; and yet, the best interest analysis is inherently biased
toward the married and intending parents.
Actually, in the surrogacy cases, disputes are between two biological
parents, maldng them similar to the other situations to which the best interest
standard has been applied. What is different, of course, is the context: instead
of two biological parents who have had an intimate relationship with each other,
the biological parents have entered into a contractual arrangement to create the
child. The cases thus present an interesting mix, in Professor Janet Dolgin's
words, of status and contract. 88 The contract between the two biological parents
purchases them application of the best interest of the child standard, which is
part of parental status, and helps courts treat the entire situation in a manner
analogous to more traditional divorce cases.
In the most famous surrogacy case, In re Baby M., the New Jersey
Supreme Court declared that the parties' surrogacy contract was void pursuant
to the state's public policy; the court thus was faced with a more traditional
custody dispute between the two biological parents.89 The lower court, also
appealing to the child's best interests, enforced the surrogacy agreement and
terminated the biological mother's parental rights. 90 The two opinions thus
87 "Traditional" surrogacy involves one woman acting as both the genetic and
gestational mother. As discussed infra Part Im.B.2, the new reproductive technologies enable
the separation of the genetic and gestational aspects of motherhood.
88 See Dolgin, supra note 1, at 1263; Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in Surrogate
Motherhood: An llhination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 515 (1990).
Professor Dolgin explains that status has the advantage of strong family relationships, while
contract allows for new freedom to make reproductive choices. See id. at 524.
89 See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
90 See In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1166-67, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
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provide useful examples of how the definition of parent interacts with the best
interest standard to affect surrogacy arrangements.
In In re Baby M., the dispute was between Mary Beth Whitehead, the
woman who had agreed to become pregnant through artificial insemination,
carry the baby to term, and then relinquish the baby and her parental fights,
and William Stem, the man whose sperm was used, and his wife, Elizabeth
Stem.91 After the baby's birth, Ms. Whitehead and her husband sought to keep
the child, and the Stems sought enforcement of the surrogacy contract.
The trial court judge began his opinion in In re Baby M. by articulating the
court's role to protect the best interest of the child over the parents' rights.92 He
stated that "the primary issue to be determined by this litigation are what are the
best interests" of Baby M.93 He then upheld the surrogacy agreement against
various challenges, primarily based in contract law, before turning to the issue
of specific performance. The critical determination was whether "an order for
specific performance would be in the child's best interest." 94 After considering
the extensive evidence proffered as to the best custodial arrangement, the court
held that specific performance was appropriate. And, since an order of specific
performance pursuant to the contract would terminate the biological mother's
parental rights, the court held that it had the right to terminate parental rights
based on its independent, nonstatutory based "parens patriae power to
determine the status of a child according to his or her best interests." 95
In In re Baby M., the lower court thus turned to the child's best interests as
a way of both ordering specific performance of the surrogacy contract and
terminating parental rights. The unfitness of the biological mother thus never
became an issue due to the court's alleged independent power to act in parens
patriae to terminate her parental rights pursuant to the contract. The contract
91 See In re Baby M., 525 A.2d at 1143. The original surrogacy contract was between
only Mr. Stem and Ms. Whitehead. See id.
92 See id. at 1132-33. He traced the court's parens patriae responsibility for the child
through early common law to contemporary New Jersey law. See id.
93 See id. at 1132.
94 See id. at 1166.
While specific performance is commonly considered to be an extraordinary remedy
available only when damages at law are inadequate, current research shows that is it far more
frequently available. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule,
103 HARV. L. Ray. 687 (1990).
95 See In re Baby M., 525 A.2d at 1171. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed this
holding because New Jersey law allows for termination of parental rights only when it is
voluntary or where there has been a finding of parental unfitness or abandonment. See In re
Baby M., 537 A.2d. at 1227, 1242. The court stated that the parents' rights were significant
in any parental rights termination. See id. at 1252.
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gave the judge the discretion to treat Ms. Whitehead as a nonparent, so long as
that was consistent with the child's best interests.
Unlike use of the best interest standard in the typical case between two
divorcing parents, where it is used to determine custody as in In re Baby M.,
the best interest standard has been applied at the stage of defining the parents.
Mr. Whitehead's parental rights, which are rarely addressed in discussion of
the case, were terminated pursuant to the agreement as well. Although New
Jersey has a rebuttable presumption that the husband is the biological father, the
surrogacy agreement required Mr. Whitehead to take all appropriate actions to
relinquish his rights. Apparently, it was also in the best interest of the child to
rebut this presumption and to terminate Mr. Whitehead's parental rights without
much examination.
Similarly, the appellate court in In re Baby M. never reached the unfitness
issue. On the other hand, it used the best interest of the child standard in
another manner. Unlike the lower court which used the best interest of the child
standard essentially to rubber stamp its decisions on parental rights, the
appellate court applied the best interest of the child standard in the most
conventional way possible-to a dispute between the two biological parents.
In In re Baby M., the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that paid
surrogacy arrangements were void, contrary to statute and the public policy that
only the child's best interests, not the parents' prior agreement, could be
considered in deciding custody. 96 Under New Jersey law, each biological
parent has an equal right to custody, and thus the court was faced with a dispute
between the biological father and mother to which the best interest standard is
applicable. The child's best interests, the court held, would be served by a
custody award to the biological father with the possibility of visitation to the
biological mother.97
The In re Baby M. case is thus transformed appropriately from a contract
dispute into a custody proceeding. Rather than an analysis of rights of all of the
potential parents (the Whiteheads and the Stems) pursuant to the surrogacy
contract, In re Baby M. becomes an examination of what custodial arrangement
will best serve the child's interests. The focus is seemingly deflected from the
parents to the child; and once again, the mother's unfitness becomes irrelevant.
96 See id. at 1246.
97 See id. at 1261. On the other hand, the court noted the difference between a surrogacy
arrangement and other custody disputes: "Mhis is not a divorce case where visitation is
almost invariably granted to the non-custodial spouse. To some extent the facts here resemble
cases where the non-custodial spouse has had practically no relationship with the child." Id. at
1263. The child's guardian had recommended at least a five-year delay in visitation, which




Both parents are then assumed to be potentially fit custodians and no issue is
presented with respect to terminating parental rights.
Nonetheless, regardless of the validity of the surrogacy contract, both the
trial and appellate courts in In re Baby M. found that the child's best interests
dictated a custody award to the biological father. Each court was able to use the
best interest standard to support its conclusions, although their determinations
differed as to whether the standard required complete termination of the
mother's rights or the opportunity for visitation.98
2. Choosing Two Parents from All of the Possibilities: The New
Reproductive Technologies
In the traditional surrogacy situation, there are only two biological parents
and courts turn to the best interest standard to decide on the appropriate custody
award. In other surrogacy cases, courts have defined away the issue of the
child's best interest by finding only one possible set of two matching parents. 99
This renders application of the best interest of the child standard irrelevant
because the two designated parents share the same custody interests.
In these situations, however, there exists the possibility of multiple
parents'00: a gestational mother, a genetic mother, an adoptive mother, a sperm
donor father, 101 a father married to a gestational or genetic mother, 102 and an
98 Martha Field has suggested that the child's best interests in a custody dispute will
yield to a custody award in favor of the more highly educated, wealthier parent; she advocates
a custody award to the mother. See Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts Gestational and
Traditional: The Argtnentfor Nonenforcement, 31 WAsiBURN L.J. 1 & 5 (1991).
99 See e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478-80 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (declaring that husband and wife were the parents where, in action for divorce, father
challenged parental rights of wife who was gestational, but not genetic, mother of twins);
Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that
genetic, nongestational mother was entitled to finding of maternity); Belsito v. Clark, 644
N.E.2d 760, 767 (C.P. Summit County Prob. Div. 1994) (finding that genetic father and
genetic mother are natural and legal parents).100 See Hill, supra note 1, at 355 (setting out slightly different list of potential parents).
101 Under the Uniform Parentage Act, a sperm donor is not the biological father if the
insemination is performed under the supervision of a physician. See UNw. PARENTAGE Acr
§ 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987); see also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-36
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that where insemination was not performed by physician,
sperm donor is declared to be the legal father).
102 In some states, the father is presumed to be the mother's husband. See, e.g., Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 110 (1989) (upholding a California statute with such a
presumption).
In a lesbian relationship, there may be a partner who is the intended (second) mother to
the child. She cannot, however, take advantage of the presumption unless she is married to
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adoptive father. 103 By deciding on only one mother and only one father, the
"intended parents," there is no question of an unfitness standard or even the
need for a determination of what would be in the child's best interests: those
individuals will be deemed the proper custodians.
In these nontraditional surrogacy cases, there are several potential bases for
parenthood, including contract, intent, marriage, or biology. But, what actually
happens is that courts rule on parenthood and the custody decision flows
inexorably from that determination. Indeed, once the two appropriate parents
have been defined, any concern with the best interest of the child with respect
to the child becomes moot. Of course, in a harmonious relationship where the
genetic and gestational parent are different, but they both agree on who should
be deemed the mother, it is sensible simply to designate the two parents. 104
The situation becomes more complicated where the agreement between the
gestational and the genetic mother dissolves. In Johnson v. Calvert, the
California Supreme Court held that the woman who contributed the egg, and
not the woman who gestated the fertilized egg and gave birth to the child,
would be considered the legal mother. 10 5 Crispina and Mark Calvert had signed
an agreement with Anna Johnson, pursuant to which Ms. Johnson agreed to
gestate an embryo created from the Calverts' genetic material. Subsequently,
Ms. Johnson became pregnant with such an embryo. During her pregnancy, the
agreement broke down and the Calverts and Ms. Johnson filed lawsuits seeking
to be declared the legal parents.
Both Ms. Johnson and Crispina Calvert could have been defined as the
mother pursuant to California's Uniform Parentage Act, which provides that a
mother-child relationship "may be established by proof of her having given
the genetic or gestational mother. For further discussion of the legal recognition of gay and
lesbian parenting relationships, see Polikoff, supra note 13.
103 The sperm donor is typically the "adoptive" father, just as the genetic mother is
typically the "adoptive" mother. In a recent twist on the potential for multiple parents, an
alternative reproduction center is accused of implanting the eggs of one woman fertilized by
her husband's sperm into the uterus of a second woman, married to another man, thereby
resulting in four potential "parents." See Jill Smolowe, The Test-Tube Custody Fight: Victims
of the Irvine Stolen-Egg Scandal Go After Twins, TIME, Mar. 18, 1996, at 80; see also
HELENA Mcrm & NAOmI R. CAHN, CoNFwEMENs: FERTImLriy AND INFERT rYIN
CONTEMORAR Y CULTuRE, ch.4 (forthcoming 1997).
104 See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 762 (C.P. Summit County Prob. Div. 1994).
The gestational mother, who was the sister of the genetic mother, agreed to act as a surrogate
and intended to relinquish the baby when he was born. See id. All of the parties sought, and
received, a declaratory judgment that the baby was a legitimate child of the marriage between
the genetic mother and her husband. See id.105 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
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birth to the child." 106 The different California courts that heard the case
acknowledged that both women had legitimate claims to being the mother, but
emphasized that California law "recognizes only one natural mother,"107 so
only one woman could hold that title. Even though California law declared that
the woman who gave birth could be recognized as the biological mother, the
court created another biological basis for motherhood: it decided that, as in
paternity, maternity could be shown by establishing a genetic connection to the
child. Thus, even though Ms. Johnson had given birth to the child, Ms. Calvert
was genetically related to the baby. To break the tie between the two women,
the court looked to intent as the touchstone of parenthood. 108 Accordingly, "she
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
own" is the biological mother. 10 9 Thus, the combination of Ms. Calvert's
genetic connection to the child with her intent to have a child, resulted in her
being deemed the "natural" mother under California law. This seems analogous
to what the trial court did in In re Baby M., when it used intent not just to
create parental status, but also to deprive a "nonintending" party of that status.
To award any parental rights to Ms. Johnson, the court believed a
gestational surrogate mother would serve only to dilute Ms. Calvert's rights as
the mother. 110 The court explicitly rejected the possibility of defining both
women as the mother.
We decline to accept the contention of amicus curiae the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) that we should find the child has two mothers. Even
though rising divorce rates have made multiple parent arrangements common
in our society, we see no compelling reason to recognize such a situation
here.... To recognize parental rights in a third party with whom the Calvert
106 See CAL. Crv. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1983).
107 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.108 See id. at 782; see also Dolgin, supra note 1, at 1294-95 (criticizing intent); Shultz,
supra note 1, at 322-23 (supporting an intent-based standard). Professor Randy Frances
Kandel asks, somewhat rhetorically, "[W]hy ... did the courts ... decline to address
contract and custody claims from the perspective that all the parties were parents of the child
and that all might potentially participate in childraising?" Randy F. Kandel, Wich Came
First: The Mother or the Egg? A Kinship Soluion to Gestalional Surrogacy, 47 RurGEns L.
REV. 165, 178-79 (1994).
109 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. An interesting question is when intent becomes
relevant. At the time of contracting, the genetic mother has the intent; at some point, the
gestational mother develops the same intent of giving birth and raising the child as her own.
See infra Part IV.C for further discussion and criticism of the intent standard.
110 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 n.8.
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family has had little contact since shortly after the child's birth would diminish
Crispina's role as mother.111
The court seemingly considered the possibility of finding two mothers,
recognizing that in reality children may have multiple parents.112 Nonetheless,
the court was unwilling to take this step, perhaps because this would have
required multiple parents at birth, rather than divorce. The court further
justified its decision as threatening to the woman acting as mother. Of course,
what this formulation conceals is not only how recognizing two mothers is such
a threatening concept within the law, but also perhaps the interrelated issue of
the difficulty of applying the best interest of the child standard in that
situation.113 Courts find application of the best interest standard difficult enough
in the conventional one father/one mother situation.
As a secondary matter, the court did point out that its rule "should best
promote certainty and stability for the child. '114 But, it then noted:
[T]he best interest standard poorly serves the child in the present situation: it
fosters instability during litigation and, if applied to recognize the gestator as
natural mother, results in a split of custody between the natural father and the
gestator, an outcome not likely to benefit the child. Further, it may be argued
that, by voluntarily contracting away any rights to the child, the gestator has, in
effect, conceded the best interest of the child is not with her.115
I11 See id.
112 Given both the number of divorced custodial parents who enter into new
relationships as well as the number of single mothers who may enter into subsequent
relationships, it is common for children to have stepparents who have not legally adopted
them and who generally stand as a legal stranger to the child. See Margaret M. Mahoney,
Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CoRNEiL L. REv. 38
(1984).
113 It is thus interesting to contrast the C.C.R.S. situation, see discussion supra notes
71-86 and accompanying text, where the court recognized psychological parents who
ultimately received custody. California does not allow "de facto" or "psychological" parents
to receive custody unless it would be detrimental to allow the child to remain with her natural
parents. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991); see also Polikoff, supra
note 13.
The gay and lesbian parenting situations have also presented issues concerning
psychological parents.
114 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783.
115 Id. at 782 n. 10. The court's statement could actually be read as an indictment of any
use of the best interest of the child standard. It only applies at a time of instability and, in
more traditional situations, it clearly signifies a dispute between the natural father and mother,
each of whom has residual custodial rights.
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Thus, even though the child's interests played some (albeit limited) role in
the court's determination, the court's focus in Johnson v. Calvert was primarily
on the adults involved and on their rights with respect to the child,
notwithstanding the court's conscientious note of the beneficial impact of its
decision on the child. In establishing the limited number of adults who were
entitled to parental status, the court predetermined, in effect, the child's best
interest according to traditional assumptions that two parents, especially when
they are married to each other, are best for the child." 6
By contrast, the dissent in Johnson v. Calvert would have relied on the best
interest of the child standard to determine parentage." 7 Justice Kennard argued
that the appropriate method for determining parenthood, for breaking the tie
between the two women who sought to be declared the "legal mother," was to
"apply the standard most protective of child welfare-the best interests of the
child."" 8 Instead of using a standard that she alleged was based in contract,
intellectual property, and tort law, Justice Kennard looked to family law." 9
Although Justice Kennard would have remanded the case (and consequently did
not indicate how she would have ruled), she did set out a series of factors to
guide a trial court's decision; application of these factors in all likelihood would
have resulted in the child staying with the genetic mother and the biological
father. 120
Justice Kennard's use of the best interest standard is particularly interesting
because of when she would use it: she would have applied the standard to the
parentage decision itself, not to the resulting custody decision.121 Her focus,
then, is always on the child, not on the interests of the adults involved.
116 This is what happens in the unwed father cases. See infra Part IlI.C.
117 See 851 P.2d at 788 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard is the only female
justice on the California Supreme Court.
ISId. at 789.
119 See id. at 799.
120 Justice Kennard's factors included: "the ability to nurture the child physically and
psychologically... to provide ethical and intellectual guidance.... the 'well recognized
right' of every child 'to stability and continuity.' The intent of the genetic mother to procreate
a child is certainly relevant to the question of the child's best interests .... " Id. at 800
(citations omitted).
Justice Kennard does dispute the majority's contention that the gestational mother's
contracting away of her rights acts as an implicit acknowledgement that a custody award to
her would not be in the child's best interests. See id. at 799-800 n.4.
121 See id. at 799 n.4.
Professor Janet Dolgin interprets the dissent's use of the best interest standard as a
suggestion "that parents can be linked to their children without reliance on inexorable truths
about the everlasting essence of the parent-child connection and that the identification of
parentage is a social choice." Dolgin, supra note 1, at 1286.
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In the majority opinion of Johnson v. Calvert, the question of "who is the
parent?" represents the determinative issue. The custody award becomes totally
dependent on the definition of parentage. In this situation of multiple women
claiming the same child, whoever is named "mother" becomes the child's
custodian and the other woman loses all rights whatsoever with respect to the
child. She becomes a nonparent, a third party. But the same is true under the
dissent's approach. Using the best interest of the child at the parentage stage of
the proceeding, as suggested by Justice Kennard, in effect makes parentage
determinative of custody. Unfitness remains irrelevant because no existing
parental rights need to be terminated. Instead of applying the best interest of the
child standard to a dispute between a parent and a nonparent, as has occurred in
the adoption contexts discussed above, the standard becomes determinative of
who is a parent. This analysis thus moots any issue as to whether the woman
who is the nonparent can nonetheless claim that a custody award to her is in the
child's best interests. The dissent is problematic because it uses the best interest
standard, which completely leaves out the nonmother to decide on parental
status. Use of the best interest standard to determine custody-in the stage after
defining parenthood-would not, however, necessarily overlook the interests of
either woman.
C. Unwed Fathers' Cases
In a series of cases beginning in 1972, the United States Supreme Court has
considered the rights of unwed fathers to custody of their children. The
conflicting opinions can be reconciled to mean two things. First, fathers have
the opportunity, not the biological mandate, to establish relationships with their
children.12 2 Second, preservation of the traditional family unit takes priority
over the rights of even the unwed biological father who does establish a
relationship with his child.' 23 These cases can also be reconciled as allowing the
presumption concerning the best interest of the child to trump the rights of
biological parents in what the Court deems to be appropriate cases and
consequently, accepting a definition of parent that excludes the biological parent
122 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 392-93 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972); see also Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977) (recognizing a parent's liberty
interest deriving from blood, state law, and basic human rights).
123 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989); Dolgin, supra note 4, at
663-72; Forman, supra note 20, at 977-78; see also Nancy Dowd, Stigmatizing Single
Parents, 18 Hv. WOMEN's L.J. 19 (1995) (discussing the many different ways in which the
law favors the nuclear family).
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from asserting rights. Just as in the surrogacy cases, courts limit parental status
to one mother and one father in the unwed father cases.
While the Court has acknowledged that intact biological families cannot be
broken up without some finding of the unfitness of the parents, 124 it stated, in
Quilloin v. Walcott, that unwed fathers who are not in intact families can be
denied parental rights based on an application of the best interest standard.1 25
Where, as in Quilloin, an adoption by the biological mother and her husband
would help to preserve an existing family unit, and the biological father had
never lived with the child or the mother, the Court held that the state may deem
his rights inferior to the child's best interests. 12 6 Although the unwed father in
that case was acknowledged to be the biological parent and had consistently
visited the child, 127 he had not legitimated the child pursuant to Georgia law,
and thus could exercise no parental powers.' 28 In Quilloin, the best interest of
the child standard serves to prevent the biological father from acquiring any
constitutionally recognized parental rights; consequently, it serves to define who
qualifies as the father without considering biology. As in Justice Kennard's later
dissent in Johnson v. Calvert, the best interest standard decides the identity of
the parent without fully recognizing the claims of the putative parent.
Indeed, the Court has consistently allowed the states to define "father" in
accordance with general societal assumptions with respect to the
appropriateness of two heterosexual parents married to each other. In Michael
H. v. Gerald D., the Court upheld the constitutionality of a California statute
124 In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982), the Court held that in a
termination of parental rights proceeding, a state must prove by clear and convincing evidence
its allegations against the parents. The previous term, however, the Court had held that there
was no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel at termination hearings. See Lassiter
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-32 (1981). For a strong defense of the
importance of keeping potentially abused or neglected children with their parents, see Michael
S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976); see also Michael Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN.
L. Rnv. 985 (1975).
125 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). Santosky involved state action to
remove a child from the family, while Qidlloin involved a dispute between nonstate actors,
perhaps thereby accounting for the different standards. Nonetheless, Quilloin shows the
impact of state choices and values on the family unit.
126 Id. at 255. Of course, he may have rights if, for example, he sends a postcard to the
putative father registry.
127 Indeed, Darrell wanted both to continue visitation with his natural father and to be
adopted by his mother's husband. See id. at 251.
128 See id. at 249.
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which presumed that a child born to a married woman, who was "cohabitating"
with her husband, was a child of the marriage. 129 In that case, a man not
married to the mother had a 98.07% probability of being the biological father;
he sought to be declared the father under California law. 130 Even though he had
some established relationship to both the mother and the child, the courts held
that he had no constitutionally recognized legal rights as a father. 131 What the
California statute at issue does, in addition to upholding the marital unit, is to
define parent so as to exclude the unwed, albeit biological, father. 132
Unlike Quilloin, where the best interest of the child justified a redefinition
of parent, in Michael H., the child's best interests were not relevant because
parent was redefined. That is, because the Court was willing to recognize only
one person who could exercise paternal rights, 133 there was no custody dispute.
Thus, in Michael H., the definition of parent implicitly decided the custody
issue, while in Quilloin, the custody issue explicitly decided the identity of the
parent. And, like the other unwed father cases, the decision in Michael H., that
the biological mother's husband was the father returns to traditional conceptions
of married parents' rights. It also shows, however, the malleability of parental
rights. If the mother was not married, then Gerald would have been named the
father. Because of the relationship of parental rights and marriage, however, he
was not the legal father. The definition of father returns to an unstable,
changing label that is independent of biology, 134 although somewhat dependent
129 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136 (1989). Many other states have similar
statutory presumptions.
130 See id. at 114.
131 See id. at 131-32.
132 See CAL. Evm. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989).
133 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130-31. The Court stated, "rihe claim that a State
must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in the history or traditions of this country."
Id. at 131. A lower court noted, "'In enacting a conclusive presumption, the Legislature must
have intended that only one man can be adjudicated a child's father."' Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1013 (1987) (quoting Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d
619, 627 (1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982)).
Other courts have held that the determination of an unwed father's paternity is subject to
a best interest analysis: if it is not in the child's best interest to declare that a biological father
is the father, then he has no rights. For example, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
best interest standard was appropriate for deciding on paternity. See In re Paternity of Adam,
903 P.2d 207 (Mont. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1544 (1996). In that case, the biological
father filed a "Notice of Intent to Claim Paternity" prior to the child's birth. His petition was
dismissed because it was not in the child's best interests to find that he was the father,
especially in light of the mother and her husband's relationship with each other and the child.
See id. at 211.
134 Traditionally, prior to Stanley, marriage (or the lack thereof) trumped biology.
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on how the state defines the child's best interests. These cases involve a
complicated interaction of determining the child's best interests and assumptions
about the intact family (or married parents). Because of the strong societal
preference for married parents, the child's best interests are presumed to be
served by according parental status to the member of an intact family.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF REDEFINING PARENT
When courts struggle with assigning parenthood, the issue of who
succeeds-whether it be as the child's custodian or as the child's parent, entitled
to exercise all of the exclusive rights associated with that status-is complex.
The indeterminacy of the concepts of both "parent" and of the child's best
interests gives judges discretion to choose any factors they deem relevant to the
custody award. When the biological mother is married and the biological
father-or the other potential biological mother-is not, the biological mother
wins. 135 When it comes to the new reproductive technologies, and there are
arguably two "natural" mothers, the mother who belongs with the biological
father wins. Similarly, in the surrogacy context, the biological father wins.
Thus, the biological mother who is not married to the biological father always
loses against a traditional-appearing nuclear family; she wins, of course, when
she is married to the biological father and is part of a nuclear family herself.
The potential adoptive parents win, so long as there is no inquiry into the
unfitness of the biological parents. This scheme may serve to reinforce married
fathers' rights. Moreover, although the rhetoric places the children's interests as
central, parental status and rights are extremely significant.
Indeed, where the line is drawn-between who is a parent and who is not-
predetermines whose rights control. In effect, what happens is that the adults'
rights determine what happens to the child. When a court holds that a biological
parent must be declared unfit before a third party may have custody, then the
biological parent almost invariably wins. 136 As the adoption, surrogacy, and
unwed father cases show, there are two different mechanisms for circumventing
135 See Dolgin, supra note 4, at 650-72 (discussing the Court's unwed father cases and
showing that courts support traditional family forms by awarding custody to the natural
mother when she is married). Stanley and Qdlloin, both concerned the rights of unwed
fathers, without an in-depth examination of the corresponding rights of wedded fathers or
unwed mothers.
136 We can contrast what happened in the case of Baby Jessica, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.
1993), to what happened in the discussion in In re C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995). In
the former case, the biological father was found neither to have relinquished his parental
rights nor to be unfit, and he received custody. In the latter case, as discussed above, even
though neither biological parent was found unfit, the potential adoptive parents won through a
best interest of the child determination.
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the fitness determination and thereby recognizing adults' rights: courts use
either a best interest of the child standard or they simply redefine the notion of
parent. In these cases, the consistent loser is the unmarried biological mother
and the consistent winner is the married, biological or adoptive father.
Determining parentage should, however, be difficult in light of the new
reproductive technologies as well as the changing shape of the American
family. As Martha Minow asserts, she is "worr[ied] about .... [a] court [that]
assumed that it knew what a 'parent' is."1137 Indeed, courts actually interpret
and reinterpret the meaning of parent, and the attendant rights, to include
different categories of adults. Consequently, the term parent is capable of
covering a multitude of people depending on the facts of the situation.
Nonetheless, most courts do seek to find only one mother and one father for
each child in accordance with dominant cultural narratives, although this too is
no longer inevitable, at least in a few adoption cases.
Instead of the continued indeterminacy of definitions of parenthood, which
perpetuate the differential treatment of mothers and fathers, and of married and
unmarried parents, several potential solutions have been proposed and are
explored below. Each sets out a different test for determining who can exercise
parental rights. The first proposal involves using biology as the basis for
parenthood. A second proposal would accord primary parent status solely to the
mother, elevating the "mother-child dyad" over other family forms.138 A third
proposal uses intent as the basis for recognizing parenthood. A fourth proposal
involves recognizing more than two adults as the parents, rather than attempting
to assign the label only to one, and using various mechanisms for designating
those adults as parents. Finally, a fifth proposal, suggesting that parenthood be
determined based on a combination of biology or adoption and nurturance,
combines elements of several other approaches. Each of these solutions has
problems in conception and application, however. What each solution does
show is the significance of redefining parents for child custody determinations
and the implications of such redefinitions for the child's interests.
A. Biology
One deceptively simple rule would reinforce the rights of the genetic
parents, requiring that custody be awarded based solely on biology. 139 Genetics
137 Minow, supra note 85, at 272.
138 For a general discussion of the "mother-child dyad," see infra notes 151-159 and
accompanying text.
139 Of course, as is clear from the surrogacy cases, and as the critique of the "biology is
everything" position discussed infra shows, genetics and biology are not necessarily the same.
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would determine the identity of the parents. This solution is effective in the
conventional custody situation, when a married couple seeks a divorce and the
husband and wife are typically the biological parents.140 It is also effective for
determining paternity, because there can be only one biological sperm donor,
and under this approach, he would be the father regardless of the mother's
marital state.141 It is, however, problematic when it comes to determining
maternity; moreover, it ignores other values that our culture finds significant.
As discussed earlier, most state laws use a mixture of biological and
emotional connections to determine paternity. While there is no distinction
between the rights of married and unmarried mothers, there are significant
distinctions between the rights of married and unwed "fathers." 142 Marriage
makes the difference as to whether the men will be defined as'the parent. Using
biology alone to establish a bright-line rule would require dissolving the
distinctions between married and unwed fathers, and simply recognizing
paternal rights that vested in the man who contributed the sperm.' 43 Thus,
But, for purposes of exploring the parameters of this approach to parenthood, I am initially
conflating the two.140 Paternity is normally not a contested issue in these cases. When it is, there may be a
statutory presumption that the husband is the biological father, or the court may reinforce his
parental rights in other ways. See, e.g., In re Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1995),
amended, reh'g denied, remanded, 1995 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 224 (Iowa Nov. 17, 1995). Until
recently, maternity was never contested.
141 See Daniel Callahan, Bioethics and Fatherhood, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 735, 736-37
(advocating such a position); Forman, supra note 20, at 988-1000 (exploring promises and
dilemmas of such an approach); Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed
Father's Right to Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDH L. REv. 971
(1992) (advocating such a position).
142 In most states, married men are presumed to be the father of marital children, even if
the spouses were not living together during the pregnancy, while unwed men must take
affirmative steps to claim their paternity. For example, see the facts of Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-15 (1989). Indeed, the stereotype of unwed fathers is that they are
uninvolved with their children. See Dowd, supra note 123, at 53 ("Mhe negative connotation
of 'single parent' is apparent in paternity determinations, where the legal process presumes
the stereotype of the unwilling, irresponsible unwed father."). Even though married fathers
may similarly be uninvolved with their children, see ARLm HocHsc-mD, THE SECOND Smi-'r
(1989); Milton Regan, Spouses and Strangers Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82
GEo. L.J. 2303, 2369 n.331 (1994); Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New
Theory of Alimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2227, 2240-41 (1994), their actual emotional relationship is
irrelevant to their legal rights.
143 In light of the accuracy of human leukocyte antigen ("HLA") testing, it would be
comparatively easy to establish just who the father was. Where there has been an artificial
insemination by a donor ("AID"), the donor would similarly be recognized as the father
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under an approach based on biology, marriage would be irrelevant for both
mothers and fathers. This would have a different impact on husbands (who
could now deny, or be deprived of, paternal status) than on wives.
When it comes to adoption, implementing a scheme where parental rights
are based on biology would accord strong recognition to the rights of the
biological mother and father. Assuming that the identity of the biological
mother is clear, a new adoption scheme based solely on biology could simply
recognize that she could not definitively relinquish her parental rights until one
year (or more) after the child's birth. Providing such a long period of time for
relinquishment accords strong recognition of her parental rights and would also
be comparatively easy to administer due to both its simplicity and its clarity.
Similarly, an adoption would be impermissible unless the consent of the
biological father, as identified through blood tests, could be procured. He too
presumably would be granted a long period of time before his relinquishment
would be final. 144
An approach based solely on biology is, of course, easy to administer.
And, it serves to protect the rights of all biological parents, regardless of their
income. It becomes more difficult to allow class to affect the custody analysis
where biology is the sole determinant of parentage.
Biology becomes a more difficult solution to the surrogacy cases where the
determination of the "mother" may be in question. While at common law she
who gave birth was considered to be the mother, she who gave birth was also
both the gestational and the genetic mother.' 45 When a gestational and a genetic
under a strict biology standard; or, as in many states, if the insemination is performed by a
doctor, the man married to the mother could be presumed to be the father.
144 The approach set out in text accords very strong rights based on biology. There are
variations, such as shorter periods before consent could be final, but they do not change the
basic scheme.
Moreover, this approach assumes that once the biological parents are identified, they are
entitled to all of the rights and responsibilities that are accorded to parental status. As Jana
Singer suggests, an alternative approach might recognize parents based on biology, but then
define the bundle of rights associated with parenthood differently. Interview with Jana Singer,
Professor, University of Maryland (Mar. 18, 1996) (on file with author). That is, the
identification of the biological "parents" could be separate from the issue of who will parent
any particular child. Resolving a custody dispute between biological parents and a third party
would then depend on what powers the law assigns to the status of biological parenthood.
145 See, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (C.P. Summit County Prob. Div.
1994). Professor Kaas advocates a strong parental preference and defines parent as someone
"who is the biological parent of a child or who has adopted a child, if the adoption is final,"
Kaas, supra note 6, at 1129. Professor Kaas would not apply the parental preference to
various proceedings, including those arising after a surrogacy or sperm donor arrangement
has failed. See id. at 1129-32
[Vol. 58:1
REFRAMNG CHILD CUSTODY
surrogate each seek to be declared the mother, however, biology provides no
simple answer. Even though one court found referred to the gestational mother
as merely an incubator,146 this is contrary to other medical evidence as to the
impact of gestational actions on the fetus. 147 Consequently, one of the other
methods explored in this paper must decide the issue.
In addition, there are more theoretical problems with this approach. As a
society, we may want to choose-and in fact, we already have chosen-other
values, such as nurturance, over biology. 148 For example, allowing biological
fathers rights to custody of an infant that are equal to those of the biological
mother may be a problematic social choice, especially where the father has had
little or no contact with that woman or the child. Or, some defend the parental
rights of married men, who may not be biological fathers, but who have
functioned as social fathers. 149 Or, the intent of the parents may be an
important factor to consider in deciding who should be declared the parents. 150
Biology can be a rigid basis for deciding parental status.
B. Mother-Child Dyad
Several feminist scholars have suggested that the core familial unit to be
recognized is the relationship between mother and child. Martha Fineman
argues that a mother-child dyad should be the primary familial affiliation. 151
146 See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,
704 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986) (Vance, J., dissenting).
147 See Sherrie Lynne Russell-Brown, Parental Rights and Gestational Surrogacy: An
Argument Against the Genetic Standard, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 525, 545-47
(1992). Ms. Russell-Brown also notes that recognition of only the genetic mother's rights
fosters exploitation of the gestational surrogate, who is likely to be poor and African-
American or Hispanic.
148 Professors Dreyfuss and Nelkin note that "genetic reasoning" may "preempt[]
discussion of other values at stake." Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The
Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REv. 313, 338 (1992).
And, the meaning of biology is inherently political. Historically, the significance of
biology has depended on race and gender. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 213; see also
Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra, at 339-41 (discussing the myth of scientific neutrality). Using a
standard based solely on biology would require some distance from this traditional use of
biology; attempts to define "biology" may inevitably suffer from questionable bias.
149 See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PtRsurT OF INTIMACY
131-37 (1993); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
150 See infra notes 160-69 for further discussion of situations, such as donor
insemination, where intent is useful.
15 1 See MARTHA FINEMAN, ThE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TW T CENTURY TRAGEDIES 233 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEtmRED
MOTHER]; Martha A. Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of
19971
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She explains that other adults may be included: "[Flathers, or nonprimary
caretakers who have sexual affiliation to the primary caretaker, are certainly
free under my model to develop and maintain significant connections with their
sexual partner and her children if she agrees to such affliation."'152 Under this
model, the (biological) mother thus has control over the child's development of
familial relationships with anyone else. The mother-child dyad gains additional
support from the work of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, who advocate that
custody and other forms of control be awarded to the one person who is the
sole psychological parent.153
This perspective definitively resolves disputes by recognizing the
decisionmaking authority of only one parent. There will be no more parental
conflicts because only the mother will have legally cognizable rights. Thus,
unwed fathers would be unable to veto the biological mother's consent to
adoption, and mothers would not be required to notify the sperm donors of their
pregnancy. 154 Presumably, in the surrogacy context, only the mother would
have any parental rights, although deciding between the gestational or genetic
mother would be difficult.
One problem with this perspective is that it perpetuates stereotypes about
women and the use of rigid gender boundaries. 155 Although women do, in fact,
provide a disproportionate share of caretaking, this statement is not true of all
women. 156 The mother-child dyad perpetuates an ideology in which only
women are encouraged to be caretakers. 157
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 955, 970-71 (1991) [hereinafter Fineman, Intimacy]; see also
Becker, supra note 41, at 203-21 (advocating a maternal deference standard).
152 Fineman, Intimacy, supra note 151, at 971 (emphasis added).
153 See GOLDSTEr ET AL., supra note 71. The "psychological parent" is the individual
"who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and
mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical
needs." Id. at 98. As formulated by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, the psychological parent
need not be biologically related to the child. See id.
154 See Nancy E. Dowd, A Feminist Analysis of Adoption, 107 HARV. L. REV. 913,
933-36 (1994) (book review). Professor Dowd notes that where a man is committed to the
family unit, the law should recognize his bond with the child. See id. at 934.
155 Martha Fineman does acknowledge that men may be primary caretakers, although
she phrases her standard as the mother-child dyad. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
supra note 151, at 234. But see M.M. Slaughter, Fantasies: Single Mothers and Welfare
Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2156, 2189-90 (1995) (book review) (suggesting some
ambivalence in Professor Fineman's inclusion of men as capable of being the "mother").
156 1 am speaking of the problem of essentializing women. See, e.g., EUZABETH V.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988); Katherine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint
Custody, Feminism, and the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BmEEEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 21 (1986).157 See Bartlett & Stack, supra note 156, at 32.
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A second problem with this perspective (although perhaps a benefit to its
proponents) -is the lack of rights for fathers and then, even if the primary
caretaker is gender-neutral, for others with whom children have developed
strong emotional attachments. While Professor Fineman believes that gender
neutrality in family law has only disadvantaged women, there are many
persuasive arguments in favor of according rights to fathers and other parental
figures. First of all, regardless of the merits of single-parent families, it is hard
for one individual to raise a child. In many single-parent families, there is an
extensive support system that helps the single-parent cope. 158 Thus, the mother
is not, practically speaking, the sole decisionmaker. Second, to the extent that
any individuals have formed significant relationships with the children, these
relationships will have no legal significance. 159 Thus, neither married nor
unmarried fathers, nor lesbian comothers could exercise any rights.
C. Intent
Another method for designating those entitled to all of the rights associated
with parental status is to use "intent." 16° This approach "places a mental
element, intention, over the tangible, biological tie." 161 Accordingly, where the
proposed parents deliberately and explicitly expend efforts to create a child,
then their intentions should be respected. 162 This approach has most frequently
been applied to the surrogacy context, where the commissioning parents-those
who, by preconception, take actions to bring about the child's existence-are
Another critique of Professor Fineman's proposal notes that she is substituting a
matriarchal family for a patriarchal family, but that the same problems remain. See Slaughter,
supra note 155, at 2188-89.
158 See generally Czapanskiy, Grandparents, supra note 5 (discussing grandparents'
roles in child care, particularly in single-parent homes). A related problem is that this model
would require massive government support to take the place of the paternal support
obligation, unless the proponents of this approach intend to preserve mandatory paternal
support responsibilities in the context of paternal rights at the option of the mother.
159 If the mother has consented to these relationships, then of course rights of third
parties will be respected. This, however, opens up another area of potential controversy as
third parties assert that the mother has in fact consented.
160 For discussions of the different meanings of intent, see Dolgin, supra note 1; Hill,
supra note 1; Shultz, supra note 1.
161 See Hill, supra note 1, at 414.
162 See Anne Reichman Schiff, Fnstrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID
in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 538-42 (1994) (discussing the role of intent when a woman is
artificially inseminated by a donor, and both agree, preconception, on the donor's rights);
Shultz, supra note 1, at 302-03.
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deemed the intended parents. 163 By signing a contract in which they agree to
pay someone else for her "services" in helping to create a child, they deserve to
be named the parents. But the approach may also be useful in the adoption
context, where the people who want the child, care for the child, and have
taken the child after she is relinquished, could be deemed the intending
parents. 164 This approach appears to assume that the birth mother did not intend
to get pregnant or keep the baby, while the adoptive parents have undergone an
intrusive home study and otherwise indicated their extremely strong intent to
raise a child. Similarly, the unwed father who is unaware of the pregnancy or
the child,' 65 or who is uninvolved with the child, could be termed an
unintentional parent who has not chosen the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood. The law could elevate conscious and deliberate choice as the sole
criterion of parenthood; in Professor Shultz's words, this would mean that
"intentions that are... bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal
parenthood."1 66
One problem with this approach, however, is that intent changes. The
gestational mother may not have initially intended to keep her child but, as the
pregnancy progresses, she may change her mind.1 67 Or, the "intending
parents" may have only wanted a genetically normal, healthy child, while the
child born to the surrogate is not. An unwed father may not have intended to
create a child, but may change his mind as the pregnancy progresses or after he
meets the child. At what point in time do we respect intent?
A second problem concerns the meaning of intent and choice. All choice is
socially constructed, and there is a debate over when to respect choice and
when to act paternalistically. 168 Should we respect the surrogate mother's initial
163 See Hill, supra note 1, at 414-19.
164 Professor Shultz suggests that using intent in the adoption context might allow
adoptive and biological parents more choices on how to structure the adoption itself (although
she does not address the issue of how to decide between the two sets of parents if the adoption
becomes contested). See Shultz, supra note 1, at 321.
165 In both the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases, the father was, at least arguably,
unaware of the child until after his or her birth, although Otto Kirchner was aware that Baby
Richard's mother was pregnant. See Baby Richard, 649 N.E.2d 324, 327 (I11. 1995); Baby
Jessica, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
166 Shultz, supra note 1, at 323.
167 As Vicki Jackson points out, intent regarding parental status frequently changes; we
do not force women who, prebirth, intend to put their children up for adoption, to actually do
so after birth. See Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J.
1811, 1814 (1988).
168 See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMiNIsM UNMODIF'mD: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAw (1987); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redu: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1995); Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal
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choice? Or, should we, as some critics suggest, instead look at the culture
which forced her into such a choice, and respect her later decision to keep the
child? Third, the intent model assumes legal acceptance of surrogacy, an
assertion that is becoming increasingly counter-factual. 169 Finally, it seems
harsh toward the biological parents to cut off their rights without allowing them
second thoughts. While biology is not an appropriate test by itself, the intent
approach makes it irrelevant.
D. Responsibility
A fourth solution would recognize parenthood based on a combination of
biology and responsibility. In this view, only people who had indicated that they
would act responsibly and altruistically toward their children would be able to
exercise parental rights. 170 Parental rights would be based on a "mixture of
genetic relationship, assumption of responsibility, and provision of care to the
child (including gestation)." 171 Biology alone, then, would be insufficient
without other indicia of caring and attachment.
In the unwed father and adoption cases, paternal rights would depend on
the man's relationship with the mother and with the child (depending on her
age). If he had established a sufficient relationship, then he would be able to
veto an adoption and gain custody. 172 Similarly, in the surrogacy cases, the
question would be who had established a relationship with the child. The
mother would probably be the woman who had gestated the child, regardless of
her genetic relationship, while the father would be the sperm donor. In the
Method, 16 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 373 (1991) (book review); Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559 (1991).169 See Mahoney, supra note 112.
170 See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality,
38 UCLA L. REv. 1415, 1465 (1991); Shanley, supra note 68, at 65; see also Katharine T.
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YAiE L.J. 293 (1988) (emphasizing the importance of
relationships and responsibility over rights).
This approach is similar to the so-called functional approach to parenthood, which
recognizes families based on whether they fulfill the normal functions of families. See
Bartlett, supra note 13, at 944-51 (proposing nonexclusive parenthood to recognize de facto
parenting relationships in addition to those of the legal and natural parents); Polikoff, supra
note 13, at 489-90 (expanding the definition of parent to include functional parents); Note,
Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal
Definition of Family, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1640, 1644-48 (1991) (contrasting functionalist and
formalist approaches to defining family members).
171 Shanley, supra note 68, at 65.
172 See Czapanskiy, supra note 170, at 1477-80 (setting out different ways to measure
responsibility of unwed fathers so that they could veto adoptions).
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newborn context, this approach might lead to the same result as an approach
based on intent.
While the relationship test seeks to reward behavior that is child-oriented, it
may be difficult to administer. What efforts must a man make toward a
pregnant woman in order to ensure his rights with respect to a newborn? Is
gestation really sufficient to establish maternity? If a genetic mother
accompanies the gestational mother to all doctor's appointments, etc., has she
shown adequate commitment? What about the gestational-genetic surrogacy
cases, where both women have a biological and emotional relationship with the
child? As with the multiple-parent standard, discussed next, judges continue to
have a great deal of discretion to define parents. On the other hand, like the
multiple-parent test, there is arguably less discretion to exclude people with
parental relationships who would not otherwise qualify because they lack the
necessary biological or adoptive connection to the child. 173
E. Multiple Parents
The final solution, and perhaps the most radical under existing law, would
involve recognizing multiple adults entitled to the bundle of rights associated
with parental status. While this solution builds on the intent, biology, and
responsibility approaches, it differs because of its explicit recognition of the
possibility of multiple parents, beginning at a child's birth.174 Current legal
doctrine generally assumes one mother and one father for every child.175 But,
173 There are other possible rules as well. For example, some have suggested the
development of an intermediate status of parents, with rights somewhere between those of
third parties and those of parents. See Elizabeth J. Aulik, Comment, Stepparent Custody: An
Alternative to StepparentAdoption, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 604 (1979); Kris Franklin, Note,
"A Family Like Any Other Family": Alternative Methods of Defining Fanily Law, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027, 1061 n.188 (1990-91) (suggesting a possible system with
different levels of parenting); see also Mahoney, supra note 112, at 52-58 (advocating
stepparent's assumption of duties traditionally assigned to legal parents).
174 The intent and biology approaches either explicitly or implicitly contemplate two
parents. The fimctional and responsibility approaches examine whether the adults have acted
as parents as a basis for according them rights; many advocates of the "responsibility"
approach implicitly assume two parents when they discuss "triadic" relationships between the
parents and a child, even though they acknowledge the possibility of more than two parents.
175 Professor Shultz insists that choosing between potential parents is necessary as a
result of our social policies relating to parenthood so that children will not have more than one
mother or father. See Shultz, supra note 1, at 330; see also Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,
763 (C.P. Summit County Prob. Div. 1994) (stating that "society and the law recognize only
one natural mother and father"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1012
(1987); Polikoff, supra note 13, at 468 (discussing a legal theory of parenthood).
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given the complexities of adoption and surrogacy, and of alternative family
forms, the reality is very different from legal doctrine. Some scholars have
suggested that biological parents should be able to designate additional adults as
parents.176 Others have suggested that the law accord some form of parental
status to an adult who has been the "legal, natural, or psychological parent of
the child[,]" provided that there has been some type of continuing relationship
established between the child and the third party. 177
Under this approach, disputes between a gestational and a genetic mother
could be resolved through the same means as other custody disputes between
parents. Under the existing system, once one woman is defined as the mother,
the other woman loses virtually any rights or relationship to the child because
she is entitled to the same rights as any other third party. With a recognition of
two mothers, either one could receive custody or visitation; or, in cases of
unfitness, the rights of one could be terminated.
While this approach recognizes that a child might have multiple parents at
birth under a surrogacy arrangement, the situation is somewhat different when
it comes to adoption. Adoption disputes arise only after one parent has begun
the process of relinquishing her rights, and either she changes her mind, or the
biological father contests the adoption. Nonetheless, disputes between the
potential adoptive parents and the biological parent(s) could also be resolved
through the multiple-parent model, depending on when the biological parents
Interestingly enough, the Court has not completely foreclosed a constitutionally protected
liberty interest for adults other than the "natural parent." See Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 855 (1977).
176 See Polikoff, supra note 13, at 464 (proposing that parenthood be expanded to
"include anyone who maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a legally
recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in
nature"). Professor Katharine Bartlett proposes that the relationship of the potential
psychological parent must have begun "with the consent of the child's legal parent or under
court order." Bartlett, supra note 13, at 947.177 See Bartlett, supra note 13, at 946. Professor Bartlett's proposal is limited, however,
to situations outside of the traditional nuclear family where the child's relationship with her
parents has been disrupted, and would probably not apply to newborns.
The Oregon state legislature enacted a statute that allows anyone who "has established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child" to seek custody or visitation.
OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119 (Supp. 1994). The statute defines a qualifying child-parent
relationship as one that has existed for six months prior to the filing of the action, and where
the emotional parent has lived in the same household as the child, or where the person has
maintained a continuous relationship for a year. See id. at § 109.119(4)-(5). By its terms, the
statute cannot apply to newborns.
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challenge the potential adoption. 178 If the potential adoptive parents are
proceeding pursuant to a court order as to their rights, then they would
probably qualify as "psychological" parents to whom custody might be
awarded, while visitation could be awarded to the biological parents (or vice
versa).179
Such a solution helps with the difficulties in determining parenthood.
Recognizing multiple parents responds to the realities of many children's lives
who may have multiple parents through surrogacy and adoption, as well as
through gay and lesbian parenting relationships and remarriage. 180
Nonetheless, there are two sets of problems with the multiple-parent
approach. The first problem concerns when to recognize multiple parents and
the discretion that this continues to grant judges. Most of the proposals for
multiple parents require some emotional relationship between the child and the
parent; where an infant is involved, then, the multiple-parent approach must
rely on another method, such as intent or biology. For older children, where
there actually may be multiple adults with legitimate claims, it may be difficult
to balance the adults' rights while respecting those of the child.
The second problem with this approach is that recognizing multiple parents
is likely to require further judicial involvement when the parents cannot agree
on custody and other issues. The standard that would most probably be used to
resolve these disputes among parents is the best interest standard, with all of its
drawbacks, including the race and class biases inherent in application of the
178 The Uniform Adoption Act gives a parent just eight days in which to change his or
her mind after the child's birth, regardless of when during that period, the consent was
actually signed. See UNiF. ADOmTIoN AcT §§ 2-404, 2-408(a), 9 U.L.A. 30, 33 (Supp.
1996). The Uniform Adoption Act does not seem to allow for revocation if the consent has
been signed after that eight-day period, unless the adoptive parents agree to the revocation.
See id. §§ 2-404(a), 2-408(a). Eight days is clearly too short a time period, especially given
that the parent might not even sign the relinquishment until seven days after the birth. While
almost everyone involved in adoption issues believes that the biological parents need some
period of time before they can finally relinquish their parental rights, the decision as to the
appropriate amount of time is extremely difficult.
179 The multiple-parent model also suggests that adoption records remain open so that,
even if there is no visitation between the child and the biological parents, they are able to
communicate when they so choose.
180 For example, at least 15% of children in divorced families will have parents who
remarry and redivorce. See Susan Chira, Struggling to Find Stability When Divorce Is a
Pattern, N.Y. Trms, Mar. 19, 1995, at Al; see also David L. Chambers, Stepparents,
Biological Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of "Family" After Divorce, in DivORCE
REFORM AT TE CRossRoADs 102 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990);
Bartlett, supra note 13, at 912-19 (pointing out the need to reconsider stepparents' rights);
Mahoney, supra note 112, at 60-78 (discussing the legal rights of stepparents).
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standard.181 As discussed in this Article, the best interest standard may indeed
be appropriate because of its contextuality; nonetheless, it provides no real
guidance for sorting through the claims of the different adults.' 82 If we choose
to recognize multiple parents, we must recognize that this multiplies the
indeterminacy inherent in determining the child's best interests.
F. Conclusion
Each of these approaches represents an attempt to provide some certainty
and predictability to the increasingly complex issue of determining parentage.
More importantly, each approach shows that the parentage decision will
determine custody. When we define parent, we are also framing child custody
disputes. The best interest of the child standard thus enters at a second stage; it
only applies between people deemed to be parents, when there is an
intraparental conflict. 183 Throughout all custody situations, then, the status of
the adults involved, once again, sets out the framework for determining
children's rights. Children's interests and parental rights may be coterminous in
most custody disputes; nonetheless, children must be explicitly accorded
recognition during the proceedings that determine their future.
181 Under a best interest standard, many children would probably be removed from their
poor families because of their mothers' problems in receiving benefits and finding housing.
See VALEmmI POLAKOW, LvTs ON THE EDGE: SINGLE MOTHERs AND TH R CHnDREN IN THE
OTHER AmEuCA 66, 91 (discussing the arbitrariness of intervention by child abuse and
neglect authorities in poor women's lives); Madeleine L. Kurtz, The Purchase of Families
into Foster Care: Two Case Studies and the Lessons They Teach, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1453,
1493 (1994).
182 A third problem is with the child's ability to bond with numerous adults. As
discussed infra notes 192-93, however, a child may bond with more than one or two
caretakers.
A Wisconsin court suggested a fourth, primarily logistical, problem with granting
parental rights to more than two people: a child would be subjected to numerous custody and
visitation arrangements. See In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 208 (Wis. 1991). This
problem is, however, already implicit in any situation where the parents separate; not only
will the parents need to arrange visitation schedules, but grandparents may also seek access to
the child.
183 As discussed earlier, this two-stage process is obscured in the context of divorce,
when custody disputes are between husband and wife. Nonetheless, the same process occurs.
It is because the law defines the husband and wife as father and mother, and grants them
certain rights, that custody is almost invariably awarded to one of them.
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V. RECOGNZING PARENTS AND CmLDREN IN RELATIONSHIPS
It is important, then, to recognize the rights of both parents and children, to
allow adults' interests to set out the overall framework, and then to listen to
children's interests. In order to respect the rights of both, the law needs to
separate the issue of who is entitled to the bundle of rights associated with
parental status from the issue of what custodial arrangement is in the child's
best interests.
A. The Importance of Acknowledging Parental Rights
In a significant article reinterpreting the Court's parental custody and
control cases, Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues that parental rights
are often based on notions of children as property.184 She asserts that the
common law tradition of viewing fathers as entitled to do what they wished
with their children has made a contemporary reappearance in doctrines
recognizing the rights of biological parents over a child's relationships with
significant others. 185 She argues, instead, for a more child-centered family law
jurisprudence that recognizes children's interests in stability and care, rather
than parental rights to their "property" interests in their children. 186 Other
scholars have similarly charged that children's voices are excluded from the
law. 187 Indeed, James Dwyer attacks any claim that, to protect the adults'
interests, parents should have any rights to raise their children. 188 He asserts
that the strength of parental desires to raise a child is insufficient to justify their
rights; that it is anomalous to grant parents rights over others when the law does
not grant such rights of control in any other situation; and that parents do not
need rights in order to "satisfy their interest in caring for a child." 189 He
184 See Woodhouse, supra note 23, at 1113-17; see also Mahoney, supra note 112, at
43 (charging that the ownership model of parenthood, in which courts seek to decide who can
exercise rights to a child, leads to "the commodification of children").
185 See Woodhouse, supra note 23, at 1113-14.
186 See id.; Woodhouse, supra note 79, at 1827-28.
187 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 46, at 15-17; see also Martha Minow, Rights for
the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WomEN's L.J 1, 6
(1986).
Katherine Federle argues that to truly respect the rights of children, we must treat them
as a party to any dispute that affects them, and, to ensure adequate representation, appoint
them counsel. See Federle, supra note 49, at 1562-64. She believes, for example, that
children must approve any custodial outcome that affects them.
188 See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents'Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1439 (1994).
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instead argues that parents should have Hohfeldian privileges, 190 and that
children's rights, as asserted by the state pursuant to a substituted-judgment
approach, should trump parental rights.191
While I agree that it is critical to respect children's rights and relationships,
to make decisions that are in their best interest, and to listen to them, I believe
that parents' rights can also be respected without classifying children as
property or without ignoring children's actual interests. Instead of reinforcing a
dichotomy between the interests of parents and the interests of children, we
should recognize that in most cases, they overlap significantly. 1 2 Even when
189 Id. at 1440. He also dismisses the rationale that parental rights are necessary in order
to ensure that poor parents are not subject to discrimination. See id. at 1439 n.281.
190 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundanental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
19 1 Mr. Dwyer's arguments against granting child-rearing rights to parents and his
alternative approach are not, however, persuasive. First, a substituted-judgment approach is
highly problematic in and of itself. See ToM BEAUCHaIm & JAMES F. CHIDRESS,
tPRNcEPLE- oF BIOMEDICAL ETnucs 171-73 (4th ed. 1994). As applied to children, it is
particularly difficult. See, e.g., id. at 172; DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNAunc
lEVNION 401 (1986) (noting that where the person has never been "competent," the
substituted-judgment doctrine is irrelevant). It also ignores the importance of any separation-
of-powers model with respect to determining children's interests. See Ira C. Lupu, The
Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CH. L. REv. 1317 (1994).
Second, notwithstanding the allegation that no other group asserts such life-determining rights
over any other group, it is clear that the parent-child relationship is different from any other
legal relationship. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 149, at 176-83 (discussing the importance of
status in family relationships). Third, Dwyer is too quick to dismiss the equal protection
claim; he states that "poverty of the parents generally does not by itself make removal the best
option for the child." Dwyer, supra note 188, at 1439 n.281 (emphasis added). Thus, poverty
may actually be sufficient to justify removal under his scheme. In light of the differential
treatment of poor and rich women within family law, poverty could easily become the only
reason to remove children in the absence of strong parental rights. See generally Ashe &
Calm, supra note 86; Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of
the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist
Mindset of Law, 53 Omio ST. L.J. 1205 (1992); Dorothy E. Roberts, Cuime, Race, and
Reproduction, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1945 (1993). Finally, because Dwyer dismisses any interests
that parents may have in child-rearing as an insufficient justification for parental rights, he
accords no weight whatsoever to those interests, even as part of a larger equation.
192 As discussed later in this Article, obviously, the most difficult cases do involve
conflicts between parents' and children's rights (and relationships). After the Court denied
certiorari in Baby Richard, 115 S. Ct. 1820 (1995), I recall a discussion on the Internet about
which set of parents were acting selfishly, without regard to the child's best interests. Some
maintained that the adoptive parents should have arranged visitation between the biological
parents and Richard in order to ease the eventual transition, while others maintained that the
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the interests diverge, however, respecting children's interests does not mean
overlooking adults' interests, nor should recognizing adults' interests mean
trivializing children's interests.
Parents develop complex emotional and psychological bonds with their
children that should be respected by the law. Even when children do not live
with them, parents can develop significant relationships with their children that
benefit both the parent and the child. This happens, perhaps most obviously,
when a noncustodial parent continues to visit the children after the parents have
separated. It also happens when a child has been placed in foster care and the
parent(s) remain in contact with the child.193 And, most pregnant women feel a
bond with the child that they carry. 194 Recognizing those connections and
relationships does not necessarily mean that parents have property rights in their
children; it simply means respect for relationships from the parents'
perspective. 195 As Professor Bartlett points out: "If we have to choose between
children and adults, we may prefer to be a society which puts the child's
interests first, but our larger concern is how the interests of both parent and
child link together in relationships."1 96 This suggests the importance of an
explicit recognition of parental rights and relationships. 197 Parental rights are
biological parents should have recognized that it was in Richard's best interests to remain with
the adoptive parents.
This discussion shows how language affects our perspective as to what constitutes
children's best interests and parental rights. Each set of parents could have phrased its
arguments in best interest of the child terminology.
193 See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate ParentalRights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 469
(1983); Kurtz, supra note 181, at 1518-19. Even in abusive relationships, there is generally
some connection between the child and her biological parents. See Annette Ruth Appell,
Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and
Practice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997, 998 (1995); Ashe & Calm, supra note 86, at 77-78; Candace
M. Zierdt, Make New Parents but Keep the Old, 69 N.D. L. REv. 497, 497-99 (1993)
(recommending "weak adoptions" for older children in foster care).
194 See Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on
'Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REv. 355, 363 (1989); Jackson, supra note 167, at
1820 n.23; Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1325, 1337-39 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of
maternal-fetal interdependence).
195 See Bartlett, supra note 170, at 295. Even though parents may not always act in their
children's best interests, see, e.g., Lupu, supra note 191, at 1327, they still maintain
connection to their children and often believe that they are doing what is best.
19 6 Bartlett, supra note 170, at 304; see also Czapanskiy, Grandparents, supra note 5, at
1361-63 (discussing how not to privilege the interests of grandparents, parents, and
grandchildren over each other and, instead, to respect their interdependent relationships).
197 Feminists have been concerned with distinguishing relationships from rights, while
recognizing the importance of both. See Bartlett, supra note 40, at 842-43. When we are
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already implicit in our family law system, beginning with our deeply held
assumptions about the fitness of biological parents with respect to the custody of
their children.
A more explicit recognition of adult interests and attachments in the
parentage determination might lead to recognizing multiple parents in certain
situations involving conflicts between the adults.19 8 In surrogacy situations, the
"intending" parents and the surrogate mother all have an interest in and some
type of relationship to the child, and so perhaps all should be recognized as
parents.19 9 Where gestational and genetic parenthood is different, then it also
may be important to recognize multiple parents based on their connection to the
child.200 In the "unwed" father cases, where the mother is married to a man
who is not the biological father, there are, perhaps, two men who could have
paternal rights. Of course, the biological father must do more than contribute
sperm, but, under the facts of Michael H., the state gave the unwed father no
opportunity to prove his interest. 20 ' And, in the adoption context, at some point
after the child has lived apart from her biological parents (perhaps three
months), the potential adopters should also be granted parental rights. Then,
within that given universe of parents, courts can make the appropriate custody
and visitation determinations by listening to the child's voice and respecting her
perspective. For the child, retaining (or building) connections with multiple
talking about parents, I believe that rights and relationships are intertwined; there must be the
right to establish a relationship, and the relationship can help to establish the right.
198 Some have suggested that babysitters, or that anyone who snatches a child from the
grocery store, would be entitled to parental rights. Cf. In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 199
n.1 (Tex. 1994) (Enoch, J., dissenting). This is a red herring. Parental rights must have some
colorable legal claim; kidnapping constitutes an illegal claim. Parental rights must have some
basis in relationship and responsibility. Babysitters only have derivative responsibility; the
parent retains ultimate authority.
199 This brings together the intentional approach to parenthood with positions advocated
by feminists, and will probably make neither of them happy. Many feminists are
antisurrogacy under any circumstances; they believe that if surrogacy occurs, the surrogate
mother should be the sole parent of the child. See, e.g., PHYujs CHsLER, SACRED BoND
16-17 (1988). While I too believe that surrogacy can be exploitative, my proposal only
addresses those situations where surrogacy has occurred and the surrogate is claiming parental
rights. I am not discussing the legal permissibility of surrogacy itself.
200 Kandel suggests that this should be based on biology. See Kandel, supra note 108, at
190. I, instead, believe it should be based on both biology and emotional connection.
201 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-16 (1991). For a contrary view of
Michael H. that respects the interrelationship of the family members, see REGAN, supra note
149, at 131-36.
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adults is a means of respecting her relationship with the people who care the
most about her.202
Recognizing multiple parents complicates custody decisionmaling, and
should not be the automatic response to contested adoptions, surrogacy, and
similar cases.203 Indeed, in most cases, there will be no need to think about
multiple parents because there will be no conflict between the parties. Where a
gestational and a genetic surrogate agree, for example, that the genetic woman
is the mother, then, assuming the legality of surrogacy, a statutory presumption
recognizing both women as mothers is nonsensical. In that situation, the
gestational mother has no desire to act as a parent and has no interest in
exercising parental rights. The law should not require her to do so. Similarly, in
adoption cases, where the biological mother and father agree to relinquish their
child for adoption, then it seems desirable to terminate their parental rights.204
2 02 The concept of multiple parents is generally something that would benefit children.
In fact, recognizing multiple parents can easily be justified from a child's perspective. See
Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358, 410 (1994). Professor
Woodhouse, who advocates a child-centered approach, would "recognize gestational
parenting as part of the continuum of care and ... [would] emphasize that pre-verbal children
benefit from and respond to nurturing, and may lose something of value if permanently
separated from a source of parenting." Woodhouse, supra note 79, at 1850 n.450. For
information on the psychological aspects of nurturance, see Eleanor Willemsen & Kristen
Marcel, Attachment 101 for Attorneys: Implications for Infant Placement Decisions, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 439, 442-43 (1996).
203 1 am not taking a position on the ideal number of parents for every child. Social
science and psychological research is inconclusive as to whether single parent, two-parent, or
multiple caretakers is the best structure for bringing up children. See FnMdAN, TaE
NEurERED MOTHER, supra note 151, at 145-50; Dowd, supra note 123, at 21-24; Lupu,
supra note 191, at 1331-32; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental
Liability Statutes, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 399, 423-25; Jackson, stpra note 167, at 1821 n.26
(accepting that a traditional two-parent structure is best for children, but noting that many
children are successfully brought up outside of such a structure). Given the cultural variations
in family form, at any rate, I hesitate to "essentialize" one structure.
It does seem important to ensure that there is at least one consistent "caregiver" for a
child. See generally GoLDS N Er AL., supra note 71. And, although the psychological
literature has not yet definitively proven "the upper limit regarding how many close
attachments infants can form .... the intimate and responsive nature of the caregiving
relationship that produces secure attachment would suggest the number is not great."
Willemsen & Marcel, supra note 202, at 468-69. Given the inconclusiveness of psychological
research, as to the precise number, the number of parents allocated to a child seems to depend
more on sociological, cultural, and legal constructs.
204 If the biological parents want to retain some connection to the child, then an open
adoption, where the records are not sealed and the biological parents have some visitation
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But, where there is a conflict between different adults, any of whom could
arguably be classified as parents, then we may not benefit them or the child by
somewhat arbitrarily designating one or two as those who can exercise parental
rights. Instead, where each of them has declared a willingness to assume
responsibility for the child, and each has a legal connection based either on
biology or already having cared for the child for a significant period of time
(including, I think, gestation), then we may want to recognize all of them as
parents. 205
Thus, under this proposal, the C.C.R.S. case would have a similar outcome
in terms of the number of potential parents, although the custodial outcome
might differ. The Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases would result in
recognizing two sets of parents, leaving the issue of how to arrange custody and
visitation to a second legal stage. In the gestational surrogacy cases, both the
genetic and gestational contributors would be considered the mothers. In
traditional surrogacy cases, both the intending woman and the surrogate would
be considered mothers.
It thus seems to me that there are two reasons for identifying multiple
parents at the initial stages of custody decisionmaling. First, this recognizes the
emotional attachment that adults develop toward children, and that children
rights, may be a good solution. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 193, at 444-45; Zierdt, supra
note 193, at 497-99 (recommending "weak adoptions" for older children in foster care); Judy
E. Nathan, Note, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Chdld, 59 N.Y.U. L.
Rnv. 633 (1984); see also Apt= D. SOROSKY Er AL., THE ADOPION TpIANGLE 219-25
(1970) (discussing the importance of maintaining connections postadoption); Appell, supra
note 193, at 998 (same). Even where the biological parents have relinquished their rights, it
may not be appropriate to seal the adoption records so that future contact, once the child
reaches a certain age, is possible.
205 This proposal for the basis for recognizing parental rights draws on the insights of
Katharine Bartlett, Karen Czapanskiy, and Mary Shanley into the issue of parent
identification. See supra note 170. Professor Bartlett addresses the multiple-parent concept
only in the context of families which are no longer nuclear. This differs from the functional-
family approaches where the members actually live as a family. See Minow, supra note 85, at
270-75.
Professor Joan Mahoney advocates the inclusion of "all of those who have played a
parental role in a child's life as parents, whether or not the nuclear family has broken down
and whether or not any other legally recognized parent intended to include him or her." Joan
Mahoney, Adoption as a Feminist Alternative to Reproductive Technology, in
REPRODUCTION, EiIcs, AND THE LAw 35, 47 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995). She explains
that it is important to value nurturance over genetics because the parent-child relationship,
rather than the biological connection, is more important. See id. at 48. While I generally
agree with her approach, I am not sure that I would place a greater value on nurturance than
genetics; they should each play a role in deciding the identity of the parent, to prevent race
and class biases from determining the parenting outcome.
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develop toward adults. 206 Second, it limits discretion at the initial stage of
custody decisionmaking by ensuring that all adults who might be appropriate
custodians for the child are involved. The identification of multiple parents does
not provide the ultimate answer to custody determinations, but it does establish
the framework. The child's best interest should not be relevant at the stage of
identifying the parents; rather, it should be relevant only at the stage of
determining custody. Such a process separates parents' interests from children's
interests.
There are, as discussed above, many objections to the recognition of
multiple parents, beyond the fear that it would complicate custody
decisionmaking. It would be contrary to strongly held legal presumptions about
the sanctity of the two-parent family and the sanctity of contract.2°7 Families
that deviate from the norm of two heterosexual parents are stigmatized, both
legally and culturally.208 For example, the increasing number of single-parent
families is blamed for the increase in welfare, while the Court held in Michael
H. that a child's request for constitutional respect of her relationship with two
fathers had "no support in the history or traditions of this country. "209
Some may also perceive a multiple-parent approach as antifeminist because
it threatens women's dominant role as caretaker. 210 It might be seen as diluting
206 Not surprisingly, recognizing multiple parents can also be justified from a child-
centered perspective. See Strengthening Children's Associational Rights, Panel at the Temple
Law School Conference on Children's Rights (Sept. 30, 1995) (on file with author).
207 As discussed above, see supra note 170, the two-parent family is not always the best
familial form. As for the sanctity of contracts with respect to family matters, there is, and
should continue to be, an uneasy fit between the two. See Naomi Cahn, Intrafamily Contracts
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
208 See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 123, at 20; Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of
Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexial Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Family," 29
J. FAM. L. 497 (1990-91). David Blankenhorn explains that single-parent families, without
fathers, are deviant. See DAvID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERCA (1995). The actual
data on the benefits of two-parent families is somewhat contested. See SARA S. MCLANAHAN
& IRwIN GARFNKEL, SINGLE MoTHmRs AND THEIR CHmDREN (1986); Dowd, supra note
123, at 35-42.
Studies of gay and lesbian parents show that their children are as psychologically and
socially well-adjusted as children who grow up in heterosexual families. See WmLUAM N.
ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEx MARRIAGE 112-13 (1996); Polikoff, supra note 13,
at 561-66.209 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
210 Of course, there is no one feminist position on the family. Some feminists advocate
primary respect for the woman's role as caretaker and nurturer. See Becker, supra note 41, at
203-04; Martha A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MLMI L. REV. 653, 666-67
(1992). Some advocate equal respect for men's potential roles. See, e.g., Bartlett & Stack,
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the mother's rights to custody because, in some situations, it recognizes the
interests of other potential parents.211 Moreover, such a standard might allow
men who had lived with the biological mother and child, but who are otherwise
emotionally unconnected or even abusive, to be granted parental status.2 12 This
may place additional pressures on women to stay with men, or to conform to
appropriate gender roles, because of a fear of losing custody.
Nonetheless, the overall benefits to the parents, and ultimately to the child,
may outweigh the difficulties. First, given the increasing number of families
who do not fit the traditional family form, this approach recognizes, without
necessarily ratifying, that reality.213 Multiple parents already exist because of
divorce and the formation of new families;214 but, multiple parents also may
exist at the birth of a child where various adults have made different
contributions to the child's existence. The multiple-parent approach permits
experimentation outside of the nuclear family.
Second, as Dean Joan Mahoney points out, courts should be able to sort out
frivolous claims from nonfrivolous ones.2 15 Third, and finally, this approach
ensures that both adults and children who have invested significant time and
effort in a relationship can look forward to continuing that relationship. It
protects the interests of would-be adoptive parents, both biological parents,
surrogates, and intended parents. It specifically recognizes that parents make a
major contribution to the parent-child relationship, regardless of the child's
desire to recognize that contribution. This explicit acknowledgment of parental
interests is a critical and potentially radical component because it does not
justify parental rights with respect to children's interests.
supra note 156, at 21. Some feminists focus on the child. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note
79, at 1830-31.
211 As discussed supra, unless custody cases are contested, women are more likely to
receive custody. See, e.g., MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 28, at 112-14; LENORE J.
WErIzMAN, Tm DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985).
2 12 See Mahoney, supra note 205, at 47; see also Barkaloff v. Woodward, 5 Cal. Rptr.
2d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing a trial court award of visitation to alleged batterer
who was not the biological father).
213 Correspondingly, it prevents discrimination against poor parents; children cannot be
removed from their parents based simply on income. See supra notes 188-91 (discussing
James Dwyer); notes 87-121 (discussing surrogacy).2 14 See Bartlett, supra note 13, at 880-82.
215 Mahoney, supra note 205, at 47.
While I am concerned that batterers will use their potential rights as parents to continue
the abuse against their victims, see Calm, supra note 30, and that courts may see concerned
men, rather than abusers, see Naomi Calm & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist
Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339 (1995), this seems to be a
risk that must be assumed.
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Nonetheless, the determination of parent is only the first step. Children's
interests become central and critical at the second stage. Thus, the biggest
difficulty of an approach that recognizes multiple parents is that it continues to
require some method for determining the appropriate custodial situation.
B. Rethinking the Best Interest of the Child Standard
As discussed earlier, the appropriate method for recognizing children's
interests in a custody determination is highly contested, at least within the
scholarly literature. Defenders of the best interest standard claim that, when
properly applied, it truly makes decisions that are best for the child. On the
other hand, critics of the standard charge that it is indeterminate, that it is
inherently biased in application, and that it functions as a cover for parental
interests. 216 Proponents of other approaches argue that they more accurately
serve as a proxy for representing children's interests.
Under current law, the best interest standard serves as the primary existing
method for recognizing children's rights and interests.217 In the context of this
Article, the question about the best interest standard is, especially in light of its
problems, whether it should be generally applicable when there are multiple
adults with parental interests. As June Carbone points out, "the best interests
principle is, although sometimes weaker, never stronger than the theoretical
framework that underlies it."'218 When that theoretical framework is based on
numerous values that are irrelevant to the child herself, then the standard is
meaningless for determining how best to serve the child.
Nonetheless, I conclude that the best interest standard is the appropriate
formulation for ensuring that children's voices are heard at the second stage of
custody proceedings. Once we acknowledge that children's interests and
attachments are critical, we must develop some mechanism for according
children some recognition. Others have suggested alternatives to the best
216 An even more fundamental critique of the standard questions the significance it
attaches to the child's best interests.
217 For a defense of the best interest standard, in that it does focus on the individual's
interests, as opposed to those of other interested parties, see BEAUCHAMP & C'H=LESS,
supra note 191, at 178-80. For a defense of the standard because it allows for judicial
discretion, see Schneider, supra note 30, at 2261.
Of course, decisions on custody become infected with different biases, such as the
prejudice towards the normal-looking family unit. See Czapanskiy, Grandparents, supra note
5, at 1324; Dolgin, supra note 4, at 691. We can help to protect against these biases by
naming multiple parents so that a choice against a single parent and for a traditional family
unit becomes a clearer exercise (and, perhaps abuse) of discretion.




interest standard, such as a system based on parental privileges and children's
interests, 219 or one based on granting children explicit financial stakes in the
family estate, 220 or one based on approximating past parental roles in a custody
award so that judicial discretion is at a minimum.221 But these other solutions
serve as inadequate proxies for use of the best interest of the child standard, and
may not appropriately recognize the children's interests.222
Many of the alternatives to the best interest standard continue the problem
of conflating parents' and children's interests, thereby inadequately
incorporating each into the decisionmaking process. While I concede that the
best interest standard has many problems, what is most important for me is
explicitly establishing a two-stage process to ensure that this conflation does not
occur. Thus, I would find acceptable an alternative to the best interest standard
which respects that children's interests are heard at the second stage. For
example, rephrasing the child's interests in terms of a "right to nurture" might
provide better guidance for recognizing the values that are significant in
choosing the appropriate custodian(s) among the different options. 223
Using a best interest standard means that the parenting solutions discussed
above, which completely and definitively resolve the custody decision at the
first step of determining the parents, are problematic because they do not
explicitly allow for children's interests. Thus, the biology solution, which
recognizes only the rights of biological parents, is inadequate. Similarly, the
intent approach, which focuses only on the intent of the parents, has no space
for the child's interests; the sole determinant of custody is who originally
expected to assume responsibility. The mother-child dyad solution assumes that
children's primary interests are served by remaining with their mothers, without
permitting any contrary showing.224 Consequently, none of these adequately
includes the actual voices and perspectives of children.
The two other solutions, based on multiple parents or responsibility, still
allow for the recognition of children's interests at the second stage of the
custody process. Thus, either of them might be appropriate so long as they are
applied with the understanding that they represent only the first stage. At the
2 19 See Dwyer, supra note 188, at 1446-47.
220 See Fitzgerald, supra note 46, at 100-02.
221 See Scott, supra note 46, at 630.
222 Others have reluctantly returned to the best interest standard after surveying the
alternatives. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 39, at 568-69; Mnookin, supra note 36, at 282.
223 Eleanor Willemson and Kristen Marcel emphasize the importance of identifying
what they term a "'right to nurture' or 'right to continued family relationships'[.]" Willemson
& Marcel, supra note 202, at 473.
224 A presumption for the mother, subject to rebuttal based on a showing of the child's
attachment to another person (or persons), might be a more appropriate standard. This, too,
remains subject to the other criticisms, discussed supra, of the standard itself.
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second stage, that of the child's best interests, parents' wishes as to custody,
which is now a common factor in many best interest statutes (and indeed the
first factor listed in the UMDA),2 25 would only be relevant in the actual
structuring of the custodial situation. The presumption would be that the parents
each want custody or visitation, and it is up to the court to determine what
custodial outcome will best reflect the child's interests. 226 With multiple
parents, a variety of possible outcomes is possible, depending on the situation of
each of the "parents," such as awarding custody to two parents, some visitation
to a third, and no visitation to a fourth parent. In the cases discussed in this
Article, the child's best interests will, in some sense, "trump" parental rights;
but this proposed method sets out a broader concept of the parents who are
subject to the best interest standard. Courts must still structure the appropriate
custodial situation, which is unlikely to involve joint custody between four
different caretakers, simply because of the lack of stability for the child.
Using this two-step process does not just affect custodial decisions outside
of the traditional nuclear family. For conventional families, the difference this
approach makes is that adults' rights are explicitly recognized and accorded
weight, while children's interests are recognized as both intertwined with those
of adults but also separate. The "theoretical framework" shifts from a rhetorical
focus on the interests of the child to an actual focus on the rights of both parents
and children. Custody decisionmaking becomes a more authentic process in
which courts are explicitly charged with separating adults' and children's
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Thus, there exists, albeit implicitly, a two-stage approach for deciding
custody disputes. Recognizing the utility of such an approach can lead to
respect for all those affected by the custody determination. Defining the
universe of possible custodians is the first step in all custody decisions, and is
the method for respecting parental rights. Given that the significance of
parenthood depends on legal and social constructs, we should not be afraid to
vary the meaning of parenthood depending on the parent's interests and the
child's situation. Nor should we hesitate to recognize parental rights at some
225 See UNw. MARRAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 402 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 561
(1987).
226 Of course, parental wishes would still be important when it comes, for example, to
imposing joint custody on two parents who both vehemently oppose it. Similarly, a court
should take into account, in an adoption, the wishes of both the birth parent(s) and the
adoptive parents with respect to further contact. For further discussion of the importance of
contact between birth parents and the child, see Appell, supra note 193, at 998.
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stage in the custody determination.227 The second step, examining the child's
"best interests," imperfect as it is, stands as a proxy for integrating children's
voices and interests into these decisions.
The belief that children's best interests already control custody decisions is
subject to challenge based on various critiques of the best interest standard; it is
indeterminate and biased in administration. More fundamentally and less
obviously, the application of the best interest standard depends on a series of
other decisions that determine the potential custodians subject to the standard.
The best interest standard is, for example, subsumed if we base our laws on a
mother-child dyad. We seek to assure ourselves that the best interest standard is
applied without reference to other influences and that we are truly considering
only the child's welfare. But the standard is only applied in the context of
parental rights, responsibilities, and interests. 228
Resolving custody situations inevitably requires balancing the rights,
interests, and relationships of all of the potential parents and children. Use of
the best interest of the child standard has too often served political definitions of
what constitutes a family, and who should be entitled to custody, rather than
serving the best interest of the child herself.
Redefining the concept of parent, and those who can be classified as
"parent," at least makes explicit the political judgments. Determining who
constitutes a parent establishes the framework in which custody decisions will
be made. Like the best interest standard, the concept of parent is shifting and
political. Instead of giving discretion to courts to make the initial decision of
who will be a parent, it may be better simply to designate as parents any (and
all) possible adults who deserve that title, thereby removing discretion from one
aspect of the custody-making process, and respecting the potential and actual
attachments of significant adults in the child's life.229
227 The Senate and House have recently considered a Parental Rights and
Responsibilities Act, which would provide virtually absolute rights to parents, at the expense
of both children and any state interests. See S. 984, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1946, 104th
Cong. (1995). Such legislation is dangerous because it does not recognize the need to balance
parents' and children's interests, much less the need to place children's interests first when
they conflict with parental rights. For criticisms of the Parental Rights and Responsibilities
Act, see Symposium, Meeting the Basic Needs of Children: Defining Public and Private
Responsibilities, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 317 (1996); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public
Role in the Private Famiy: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of
Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 393 (1996).
228 There are different standards for disputes that are not between the parents. In abuse
and neglect, where it is the state suing a parent, the standard is generally harm to the child or
unfitness of the parents.
229 There cannot be numerous such adults in a child's life without diluting the concept of
"attachment." See Willemson & Marcel, supra note 202, at 469.
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Naming multiple parents has implications for the meaning of parenthood
beyond those situations involving surrogacy and adoption. It helps to show the
social construction of parenthood, as well as the contextualization of any
custody decision. By designating as parents those people with biological or
strong nurturing connections to children, we show the significance of both
aspects of parenthood. We also see how parenthood is a constructed concept,
dependent on cultural definitions of who is a parent. Parenthood is not an
unchanging, constant status based on immutable characteristics; instead, it is
"pragmatic, ad hoc, contextual, and local." 230
Simultaneously, parentage sets the framework for child custody. Thus, the
custody decision is indeterminate not just because the meaning of the best
interest of the child is so variable, but also because the definitions of parental
rights are socially contingent. So, the framework itself for the standard is
somewhat unstable. Nonetheless, we can use this instability to help strengthen
our custody decisionmaking. We protect both the child's and the parents'
interests by ensuring that there are no unnecessary emotional ruptures and by
reinforcing a network of caring adults.
230 Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An
Encounter Between Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMmusM/POSrmODERNisM 19, 21
(Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
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